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In the years to come, macro economic policies in the new EU member states
will face two principal challenges. The first is to manage the continued and
probably rapid process of further real economic convergence, which will
come with high real GDP and productivity growth rates and large capital
inflows. The second is to achieve the degree of nominal convergence required
to enter into (the Third Stage of) European Monetary Union (EMU). These
two challenges are not unrelated, as rapid growth and large capital inflows
can make it harder to achieve nominal convergence, although, as we argue
below, there are good reasons to think that real convergence would be easier
to manage for some of the countries at least, if they were allowed to adopt the
Euro immediately. Both challenges relate mainly to fiscal policy: managing
capital inflows, because fiscal policy can absorb part of their demand effects,
nominal convergence, because the sustainability of public finances is part of
the requirement for entering EMU. Once in EMU, the new member states will
have to cope with asymmetric macro economic developments without
recourse to monetary and exchange rate policy. This will pose new demands
for fiscal and wage policies in particular.
The new member states have achieved considerable macro economic
stabilization over the past decade. The Central and East European (CEE)
countries among them went through the transition from central planning to
market economies, which began with severe recessions, high inflation, and
financial instability. Today, inflation rates are well below 10 percent and
nominal interest rates have declined, too. Public debt has been stabilized,
though high and persistent deficits and the need for further fiscal adjustments
are still critical issues in several cases.
The ten new members are members with “derogations” from adopting the
Euro. Like Sweden, and unlike Denmark and the United Kingdom, they
cannot formally opt out of the Euro indefinitely, i.e., they are expected to
become full members of the EMU sooner or later. As shown in Table 1, with
the exception of Poland, all of them have already announced target dates for
this to happen. Table 1 suggests that there are two groups of countries: fast
entrants and slow entrants. Estonia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Cyprus, Latvia,
Malta and Slovakia have signalled their intentions of a fast entry into EMU
by entering the ERM-2, the exchange rate arrangement succeeding the former
7
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1 Slovenia and Lithuania have officially requested in March 2006 the
start of the formal decision-making process for the adoption of the Euro.
Convergence Reports by the European Commission and European Central
Bank published on 16 May 2006
2 have concluded that Slovenia fulfilled the
Maastricht criteria. Lithuania fulfilled all but the price stability criterion.
Subsequently, the ECOFIN Council of 11 July 2006 has approved the
adoption of the Euro in Slovenia on 1 January 2007
3. Lithuania has initially
set 1 January 2007 as the official target date for the adoption of the Euro but
this is no longer relevant after the negative assessment of the Convergence
Reports. A new date has not been announced yet. Cyprus, Estonia, Malta and
Latvia aim to adopt the Euro on 1 January 2008
4. In most of the cases, the
changeover to the Euro is foreseen as a “big bang” scenario with Euro
banknotes and coins becoming legal tender upon the adoption of the Euro.
8 Introduction
Table 1: Intended EMU Membership Dates and Changeover Scenarios
a Preliminary date; 
b To be postponed 
c no longer relevant after the negative assessment of the
Convergence Reports of the European Commission and European Central Bank, 16 May 2006
Source: “Third report on the practical preparations for the future enlargement of the Euro area”, European
Commission, COM(2006)322, 22 June 2006
National target date for ERM-2 membership / Type of scenario for
Country the adoption of the euro Entry date the changeover / dual
circulation period
Cyprus 1 January 2008 2 May 2005 Big-Bang/ one month
Czech Republic 1 January 2010
a Entry date to be  Proposal expected
decided end 2006 August 2006
Estonia 1 January 2008 28 June 2004 Big-Bang/two weeks
Hungary 1 January 2010 No Big-Bang with possible
phasing out/one month
Latvia 1 January 2008
b 2 May 2005 Big-Bang/one month
Lithuania 1 January 2007
c 28 June 2004 Big-Bang/15 days
Malta 1 January 2008 2 May 2005 Big-Bang with phasing
out/one month
Poland No official target date No No
Slovak Republic 1 January 2009 28 November 2005 Big-Bang/16 days
Slovenia 1 January 2007 28 June 2004 Big-Bang/14 days
1 For the performance of the original ERM see Fratianni and von Hagen (1992).
2 See European Commission (2006) and European Central Bank (2006)
3 Economic and Financial Affairs Council Meeting, 11 July 2006, Press Release 209/11370/06
4 In the case of Latvia, a postponement of the target date is likely
4_2006  14/12/06  15:36  Stránka 8The Czech Republic and Hungary aim to adopt the Euro in 2010 while Poland
has adopted a “wait-and-see” strategy. The Czech Republic and Poland are
probably the only two economies large enough to successfully conduct an
autonomous monetary policy aiming at price stability. For the other, much
smaller and more open economies, in contrast, the value of an independent
monetary policy seems very limited.
In this paper, we discuss the challenges for macro economic adjustment
ahead. We begin, in section 2, by taking stock of the degree of nominal and
real convergence that has already been achieved. In section 3, we turn to the
development of public finance in the new member states. In section 4, we
discuss the problems arising from the perspective of continued, large capital
inflows. Section 5 considers the role of the ERM-2 and the problems
connected with convergence towards the adoption of the Euro. Section 6
looks at the task of macro economic adjustment under EMU. Section 7
concludes.
Introduction 9
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the New Member States
2.1. Basic Economic Indicators and Real Convergence
Table 2 reports a number of basic economic indicators for the 10 new member
states. Together, they account for 16.1 percent of the EU’s total population,
but only 9.1 percent of the EU’s combined GDP in purchasing power
standards. Only Cyprus, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic have per-capita
GDPs substantially larger than half of the EU’s per-capita GDP. All new
member states are small open economies, Poland being the exception with
a relatively low degree of openness. Table 2 shows that gross capital
formation ranged from 19.1 percent of GDP in Poland to 32.6 percent in
Latvia. This is large compared to an average rate of 21.1 percent in the Euro
area.
Note: Openness = (Exports plus imports of goods and services) as percent of GDP.
Source: Own calculations based on the AMECO data base, European Commission
Figure 1 shows the growth performance of the ten new members since 1996.
As a group, they experienced much stronger growth than the EU-15 or the
Euro area. Estonia, Poland and Latvia, had the highest growth rates in the
second half of the 1990s, while Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia had the
strongest growth rates since 2000. Significantly, economic growth in the
11
Table 2: Basic Economic Data, 2005
Population GDP in  PPS GDP per cap. Gross Capital 
Country (% EU-25) (% EU-25) (% EU-25) Openness Formation 
(% of GDP)
Cyprus 0.2 0.1 82.2 98.0 20.6
Czech Republic 2.2 1.6 73.4 143.5 26.4
Estonia 0.3 0.2 55.7 174.5 31.8
Hungary 2.2 1.4 62.0 136.7 22.6
Latvia 0.5 0.2 46.9 110.9 32.6
Lithuania 0.7 0.4 51.1 119.6 25.0
Malta 0.1 0.1 69.6 152.9 23.1
Poland 8.3 4.1 47.9 74.4 19.1
Slovak Republic 1.2 0.6 54.3 161.7 28.6
Slovenia 0.4 0.4 81.0 130.0 25.3
Euro Area 67.7 72.1 106.2 74.0 21.1
4_2006  14/12/06  15:36  Stránka 11group remained vigorous even while the economies of the EU-15 and the
Euro area slowed down in 2001–2005. This indicates that the growth trend of
this group does not depend entirely on growth in the incumbent member
states. Similar observations hold for real per-capita GDP shown in Figure 2.
Figure 1: Real GDP Growth, 1996–2005
Source: Own calculations based on the European Commission Autumn 2005 Economic Forecasts
Figure 2: Real GDP per capita growth, 1996–2005
Source: Own calculations based on the European Commission Autumn 2005 Economic Forecasts
Figure 3 plots the average real GDP per-capita growth rates during
1996–2005 together with the initial level of per-capita GDP in 1996. The
figure is in line with the standard “convergence hypothesis” that, with free
12 Where We Stand: Real and Nominal Convergence in the New Member States
4_2006  14/12/06  15:36  Stránka 12international trade and capital flows, poor countries should grow faster than
richer countries. From this perspective, the Baltic countries, which have the
lowest per-capita incomes in the group, should continue to enjoy the strongest
growth rates among the new member states over the foreseeable future.
Figure 3: Convergence of GDP per capita in the New EU Countries
Source: Own calculations based on AMECO database
Table 3 reports labor-productivity growth rates in the new member states and
compares them to the EU-15. Productivity is defined as real GDP per
employed person. During the second half of the 1990s, annual productivity
growth rates were about three times larger than in the incumbent EU for the
group as a whole. As in the incumbent countries, productivity growth slowed
down in 2001, but it picked up rapidly again in 2004, while remaining low in
the incumbent countries. This, again, indicates that the new member states as
a group have embarked on a growth path that is robust against economic
slowdown in the incumbent EU. Again, the highest growth rates can be found
in the three Baltic countries. Figure 4 shows that there is a tendency of
convergence of productivity, as countries with low initial levels enjoyed
higher growth rates that those with higher initial levels.
The economic transition from socialist to market economies in eight of the
new member states, and the rapid economic growth accompanying it, have
caused deep structural changes in their economies. Figure 5 looks at changes
in the sector structures. We consider four broad sectors of the economy,
agriculture, industry, construction, and services. The dissimilarity index
plotted in the figure measures the differences in the sector structure of each
new member state and the average of the Euro area economy. It is defined as
DISSIMiE = ∑|ski – sKE|, where ski is the share of sector k in country i’s GDP
Where We Stand: Real and Nominal Convergence in the New Member States 13
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DISSIM indicates a higher degree of structural dissimilarity, or less similarity.
Figure 5 plots this index for 1994 against the index for 2002. Values close to
the 45-degree line indicate little structural change. Values below the
45-degree line indicate growing structural similarity over the period.
14 Where We Stand: Real and Nominal Convergence in the New Member States
Table 3: Labour Productivity Growth
Notes: Annual growth rates of real GDP per employed person.
* European Commission Forecast, Spring 2006.
Source: Own calculations based on the AMECO database
Country 1996–2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005*
Cyprus 6.6 1.9 1.0 0.9 2.3 2.2
Czech R. 0.5 2.2 0.0 0.1 4.8 5.0
Estonia 7.1 5.6 5.6 5.8 7.7 7.9
Hungary 2.9 2.9 3.9 2.6 5.2 3.7
Latvia 5.9 5.9 4.8 5.4 7.4 8.5
Lithuania 4.9 10.1 2.6 8.0 7.1 4.9
Malta 3.8 –1.7 2.1 –1.8 –2.8 1.9
Poland 4.7 3.4 4.5 5.1 3.9 0.9
Slovak R. 4.5 3.2 5.2 2.6 5.9 3.8
Slovenia 3.8 2.2 1.9 2.9 3.7 3.1
New member 
states average 3.8 3.6 3.2 3.2 4.5 4.2
Euro Area 1.6 0.5 0.4 0.6 1.7 0.9
EU-15 1.3 0.6 0.6 0.9 1.8 0.8
Figure 4: Productivity Convergence, 1996–2005
Source: Own calculations based on AMECO database
4_2006  14/12/06  15:36  Stránka 14Figure 5: Similarity of Sectoral Structures with the Euro Area (4 Sectors)
Source: Own calculations based on AMECO Database
Based on the four-sector classification we observe that Cyprus, Malta, and
Hungary experienced relatively little structural change over the period under
consideration. For Hungary, this may be due to the fact that the country was
already a relatively open and market oriented economy before its transition
process began. In all other countries, we see indications of structural
convergence, i.e., their sector structures have become more similar to that of
the Euro area.
2.2. Nominal Convergence
Adoption of the Euro requires nominal convergence of the economies of the
new member states to the Euro economy. Nominal convergence will be
assessed on the basis of the five Maastricht criteria, low inflation, low
nominal interest rates, stable exchange rates against the Euro, and the
compliance with two reference values for general government debt and
deficits relative to GDP
5. Table 4 shows that the new member states have
already achieved a substantial degree of nominal convergence.
5 In addition, the adoption of the Euro is conditioned on the compatibility of national
legislation in the Member States with a derogation with the Treaty and the ESCB Statute. In order
to achieve this legal convergence, the legislation in all new EU Member States requires adaptation
(European Central Bank, 2004).
Where We Stand: Real and Nominal Convergence in the New Member States 15
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inflation rates in the EU plus 1.5 percent. In 2005, this amounted to an annual
rate of 2.5 percent. Table 4 shows that Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, and the
Slovak Republic violated this criterion significantly in 2005. The reference
value is calculated taking into account the inflation rates in Sweden (0.8%),
Finland (0.8%) and the Netherlands (1.5%). With 25 member states of the
EU, the critical rate of inflation becomes quite volatile, because this rate is
exposed to asymmetric shocks to the smallest EU economies. It is, therefore,
not obvious that the average of the three lowest inflation rates in the EU
provides a good yardstick for admitting countries into EMU. Since the EU-25
contains many more small open economies than the EU-15 in 1998, it is also
clear that, in contrast to frequent declarations by the European Commission
and the ECB, mechanically applying the same technical criterion to the new
member states as to the first wave of EMU members in 1998 does not imply
that the new members are treated in the same way as the incumbent members
16 Where We Stand: Real and Nominal Convergence in the New Member States
Table 4: Nominal Convergence Performance, 2005*
Notes:
* Commission services’ Estimates of April 2006
a Harmonized index of consumer prices (HICP), percentage change on preceding year. Malta: deflator of
private consumption. Percentage change on preceding year.
b Government gross debt as defined in Council Regulation EC N
o 365/93
c Calculated as 1.5% above the simple average of the HICP in Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands
d Calculated as 2% above the simple average of the long-term interest rates in Sweden, Finland, the
Netherlands.
Source: European Commission, Economic Forecasts Autumn 2005
Inflation rates
a General General  Long-term 
government government interest  rates
balance gross debt
b
%%   of GDP % of GDP %
Cyprus 2.0 –2.4 70.3 5.2
Czech Republic 1.6 –2.6 30.5 3.5
Estonia 4.1 1.6 4.8 4.0
Hungary 3.5 –6.1 58.4 6.6
Latvia 6.9 0.2 11.9 3.9
Lithuania 2.7 –0.5 18.7 3.7
Malta 2.5 –3.3 74.7 4.5
Poland 2.2 –2.5 42.5 5.2
Slovak Republic 2.8 –2.9 34.5 3.5
Slovenia 2.5 –1.8 29.1 3.8
Memo: Euro area 2.2 –2.4 70.8 3.4
Reference value 2.5
c –3.0 60.0 5.4
d
4_2006  14/12/06  15:36  Stránka 16in 1997. Since countries joining EMU have to cope with the Euro-area’s
inflation rate, the most sensible thing to do would be to change the inflation
criterion to 1.5 percent above the Euro-area rate of inflation. This would raise
the critical rate to 3.7 percent in 2005, and allow Hungary, Lithuania, and
Slovakia to pass.
In 2005, nominal convergence in terms of long-term interest rates was
achieved by all new member states except Hungary (Table 4). This shows that
the current inflation trends are perceived as credible by the financial markets.
It also implies that, in contrast to many of the incumbent member states of the
Euro area, the new members cannot expect large fiscal gains from falling
interest rates as the adoption of the Euro approaches. Most of the credibility
gains from adopting the Euro have apparently been reigned in already in the
process of EU accession.
To assess the requirement of exchange rate stability, we consider the trends in
inflation, nominal and real exchange rates over the past several years. We do
this in Table 5 for the years 2000–2004. Here, we use the European
Commission’s inflation data for 2004 and exchange rates against the Euro up
to the second quarter of 2004. Nominal exchange rate trends were stable over
this period in Cyprus, Estonia, Malta, and, to a lesser extent, Hungary. The
other countries experienced rather pronounced exchange rate trends. For the
Czech and the Slovak Republic and Lithuania, they resulted in nominal
appreciations of their currencies, while the currencies of the other countries
Table 5: Average Inflation and Exchange Rate Changes, 2000–2004
Average change in  Average inflation Average change in 
nominal exchange rate,  excess over Euro area real exchange rate
2000–2004 Inflation, 2000–2004 2000–2004
Cyprus 0.29 1.03 –0.74
Czech Republic –2.14 0.35 –2.49
Estonia 0.00 1.31 –1.31
Hungary 0.49 4.81 –4.32
Latvia 1.97 0.66 1.31
Lithuania –4.17 –1.62 –2.55
Malta 0.12 –0.22 0.34
Poland 3.86 2.27 1.58
Slovak Republic –2.33 5.74 –8.07
Slovenia 4.56 4.70 –0.14
Note: All exchange rates are units of national currency per Euro.
Source: Own calculations
Where We Stand: Real and Nominal Convergence in the New Member States 17
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calculated as the difference between the average changes in the nominal
exchange rate and average HICP inflation, in contrast, were stable only in
Malta and Slovenia. Latvia and Poland experienced real depreciations while
the remaining countries underwent real appreciations of their currencies, in
particular sizeable in the cases of Slovakia and Hungary.
Some of these real appreciations can be attributed to the Balassa-Samuelson
effect of relatively high productivity growth in the tradable sector. However,
estimates of the magnitude of this effect indicate that its contribution is
moderate at best.
6 The bulk of the real appreciations are probably due to the
large capital inflows of recent years, a theme to which we return below.
Most of the new member states comply with the 60 percent threshold for the
public debt ratio, the exceptions being Cyprus and Malta. With the exception
of Malta and Hungary the new member states comply with the 3 percent
threshold for the deficit ratio. We turn to a more detailed analysis of the public
finances next.
18 Where We Stand: Real and Nominal Convergence in the New Member States
6 See Schadler et al. (2004). For estimates of the Balassa – Samuelson effect see e.g. Kovacs
(2004) and Mihaljek and Klau (2004). Since the Balassa – Samuelson effect has already received
a lot of attention in recent years, we do not pursue this theme further in this paper.
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3.1. Public Sector Restructuring
While the new member states must strive to meet the Maastricht criteria, the
eight former socialist countries among them also have to adjust their public
sectors to the new economic environments. Over the past decade, their public
sectors have already undergone dramatic changes, as the average spending
ratio dropped from almost 60 percent in 1989 to 43.5 percent, and the
countries are much more similar in this regard now than before (Gleich and
von Hagen, 2001).
The question of what is an adequate size of the public sector is not an easy
one to answer. It requires a model explaining the size of government on the
basis of economic characteristics. Rodrick (1998), Persson and Tabellini
(1999), and Fatás and Rose (2001) suggest that the size of government can be
explained on the basis of the degree of openness, represented by the share of
foreign transactions (exports plus imports) in GDP. More open economies are
more exposed to shocks originating outside the country such as terms-of-trade
shocks or swings in the demand for exports than closed economies. A large
government sector serves as a buffer against such shocks. Thus, more open
economies should have a larger government than less open economies.
Furthermore, the demand for many publicly provided goods such as education
or infrastructure services can be expected to have a positive income elasticity.
Thus, the size of government should increase with per capita GDP,
a hypothesis which is empirically confirmed by Fatás and Rose (2001).
On this basis, we consider the following empirical model:
(1)
where G is government spending, Y is GDP, “Trade” denotes the sum of
exports and imports, and yper capita GDPmeasured in 1000 SDR. All data are
taken from IFS statistics and IMF Government Finance Statistics for 1998 to
assure data availability. We estimate this model using a panel of 22 OECD, 11
Latin American and 10 CEE countries.
7 Our estimated equation has a dummy
variable for oil exporting countries in Latin America, which have relatively
19
7 The Latin American countries are Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Venezuela,
Peru, Paraguay, Uruguay, Mexico and Ecuador.
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for the trade variable. This gives the following regression result
(2)
R
2 = 0.68, number of observations = 43, F(6,37) = 15.6, t-ratios in parentheses.
As expected, openness enters with a positive coefficient.
8 Government size
relative to GDPincreases with per capita incomes, confirming that the income
elasticity of the demand for public services is strongly positive. All parameters
are highly significant and the fit seems reasonably good for a simple equation
like this. Testing for parameter equality between the Latin American and the
other countries or the CEE and the other countries yields no evidence for
differences between these groups. The positive and statistically significant
CEEC dummy indicates that, given the openness and per-capita income levels
in Central and East Europe, the governments of these countries are still
considerably oversized. Even the vigorous growth of real GDPsince 1998 does
not change that conclusion very much; the cumulative growth of per-capita
incomes since 1998 has reduced the excess size of the governments by ratios
between 0.3 percent (Estonia) and 1.3 percent (Slovenia).
9
This implies that we should expect these governments to become smaller
relative to GDP over time and that governments will have to cut back or fade
out existing policies instead of just increasing total spending and taxes as they
take on new tasks and start providing new services in the process of adapting
the public sector to a growing market economy and EU membership.
10
Table 6 looks at the structure of public sector revenues in the new member states
in 2003. For comparison, it also reports the (unweighted) average structure for
medium-sized and small EU member countries. The group of medium-sized
countries consists of Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands; the group of small
countries consists of Denmark, Finland, and Ireland. Medium-sized incumbent
countries raise 28 percent of their total current revenues from indirect taxes and
29 percent from direct taxes. Small EU countries, in contrast, rely much more
20 Public Finance: Size, Structure and Consolidation
8 Note that the derivative with regard to openness turns negative at a trade share above 200
percent, which is impossible.
9 Using data from the most recent Commission report on Public Finance in EMU, our model
indicates that similar conclusions hold for Cyprus and Malta.
10 Orban and Szapary (2004) point out several areas in which EU membership implies growing
government expenditures for the new member states. Apart from their EU contributions, this
includes co-financing of investment projects and the increased administrative burden to
implement EU legislation.
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revenues. They also collect more of their revenues from indirect taxes. While
medium-sized EU countries collect about 34 percent of their revenues from
social security contributions, this type of revenue is much less important for
small EU countries. Since direct taxes are more effective instruments for
redistribution of income, these differences suggest a stronger focus on
redistribution in the small EU states. Since direct taxes are also more effective
in providing co-insurance against income shocks, this is consistent with the
notion that small states have a stronger preference for insurance against
external shocks. Since social security contributions have adirect impact on unit
labor cost, they affect the real exchange rate more strongly than direct or
indirect taxes. The lower share of social security contributions in the total
revenues of small EU countries suggests that these countries are more
concerned with their external competitiveness than medium-sized countries.
We take the medium-sized incumbent countries as the standard of comparison
for the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. Their shares of social security
contributions in total revenues are similar to those of the medium-sized EU
countries, but their shares of indirect taxes are considerably larger. Since
indirect taxes tend to have undesirable distributional consequences, one may
expect political pressures for a more equitable distribution of the tax burden
leading to an increase in the share of direct taxes and a reduction in the share
of indirect taxes in the future.
Table 6: Structure of Government Revenues (%), 2003
Direct taxes Social security Indirect taxes
in total revenues contributions in total revenues
in total revenues
Medium-sized incumbents 29.4 33.8 28.4
Czech Republic 21.0 32.5 24.7
Hungary 22.9 30.0 33.6
Poland 16.9 35.9 36.9
Small incumbents 42.3 15.6 32.8
Cyprus 26.4 17.7 43.0
Estonia 22.3 27.4 29.6
Latvia 22.7 25.3 32.6
Lithuania 26.7 25.5 37.4
Malta 27.8 18.9 32.4
Slovak Republic 15.0 29.7 23.7
Slovenia 16.2 31.7 41.7
Note: Data for Slovenia are from the 2003 Pre-Accession Report and relate to the year 2000. Data for
Cyprus and Malta are from national statistical offices.
Public Finance: Size, Structure and Consolidation 21
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Denmark, Finland, and Ireland. In the three Baltic states, the share of indirect
taxes in total revenues is comparable to the average small EU country. In the
Slovak Republic, in contrast, it is much lower, and in Slovenia much higher
than in the small incumbent states. The share of direct taxes is very small and
the share of social security contributions very large in the small new member
states compared to the small incumbent states. This suggests that future
reforms will reduce the share of social security contributions, especially as
these states will tend to lower social security contribution rates to improve
competitiveness in the EU markets. At the same time, direct taxation should
become more important as considerations of distributional equity become
politically more important.
In sum, these comparisons lead us to expect that future tax policies in the new
member states will be guided by the wish for more distributional equity of the
tax system, leading to more effective direct taxation. Furthermore, we expect
a reduction of social security contributions in the smaller states.
Turning to the expenditure side, Table 7 shows that medium-sized incumbent
EU members have lower shares of public salary payments and of transfers in
total expenditures than small incumbent states. Since public sector
employment tends to be more stable than private sector employment, this,
again, is compatible with the notion that small open economies demand more
22 Public Finance: Size, Structure and Consolidation
Table 7: Structure of Public Expenditure (%), 2003
Note: Data for Slovenia are for 2000.
Source: Own calculations.
Compensation Transfers  in  Subsidies Capital 
of employees total spending expenditures
Medium-sized 
incumbents 21.4 55.6 4.2 4.2
Czech Republic 13.8 39.9 5.0 7.3
Hungary 26.7 50.9 4.0 6.1
Poland 25.7 57.0 1.1 7.8
Small incumbents 28.0 61.3 2.8 6.6
Cyprus 32.4 41.7 2.6 8.1
Estonia 26.4 60.4 3.1 12.2
Latvia 23.3 49.0 1.8 5.5
Lithuania 32.9 62.4 3.1 8.1
Malta 28.6 n.a. 4.1 9.9
Slovak Republic 17.5 37.8 2.9 5.1
Slovenia 22.5 40.2 3.1 9.4
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incumbent states also have lower shares of subsidies paid to the private sector
and higher shares of capital spending.
Among the new member states, Hungary and Poland allocate similar shares of
total expenditures to salaries and transfers as the reference group. In contrast,
the Czech Republic has a relatively low share of wage expenditures and
transfers. Among the smaller countries, the Baltic states spend similar shares
of their total expenditures on employee compensation as the reference group,
and Estonia and Lithuania have very similar shares of transfers compared to
that group. In contrast, transfers are still relatively low in Latvia, the Slovak
Republic, and Slovenia. All new member states spend larger shares of their
expenditures on public sector investment. Interestingly, with the exception of
the Czech Republic the new member states do not spend more of their total
government outlays on subsidies than the incumbent member states.
3.2. Sustainability
Membership in the EU comes with the unconditional obligation to maintain
sustainable public finances. Sustainability is not a very precise concept in
practice.
11 In terms of technical economic analysis, it is the requirement that the
government operates within its intertemporal budget constraint, i.e., that the
discounted sum of all future expected expenditures, including debt repayment,
does not exceed the discounted sum of all future expected revenues.
12 The
Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)
are – albeit imperfect – attempts to make sustainability operational. The EDP
combines the unconditional obligation on the part of the member states to avoid
“excessive deficits” with a procedure providing a regular assessment of fiscal
policies in EMU and, if necessary, penalties for profligate behavior (Article
104, Treaty of European Union). The European Commission monitors
budgetary developments and the stock of public sector debt of the member
states, checking in particular their compliance with two reference values for the
ratio of the deficit to GDPand the ratio of public debt to GDP. These are set at
three and 60 percent, respectively (Protocol on the EDP).
13 The criteria do not
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11 See Perotti et al. (1998) for a detailed discussion.
12 See e.g. Sargent and Wallace (1981).
13 These values are obviously arbitrary. They were derived from the EU average debt ratio in
1991. Note that the IMF finds that in most cases of emerging market economies defaulting on their
public debt, the debt ratio was below 60 percent, in 35 percent of the cases it was below
40 percent. (Jonas, 2004).
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any sanctions per se. The decision whether a deficit is excessive and should be
penalized is taken by the ECOFIN Council.
14
Figure 6 shows the debt-GDP ratios of new member states in 1995, 2001, and
2004.
15 Cyprus and Malta clearly exceed the 60 percent reference value, with
an increasing tendency. Hungary and Poland both did so in the mid-1990s, but
managed to bring the debt ratios down considerably due to strong economic
growth and the real appreciations of their currencies.
A recent European Commission (2003b) paper studies the compatibility of
some of the new member countries’fiscal policies with the debt criterion over
the longer run. It estimates the debt-GDP ratio in 2005 and 2015 implied by
four different scenarios: Compliance with the deficit targets expressed in the
most recent PEPs, a balanced-budget policy from 2005 on, a small-deficit
policy (1 percent from 2005 on), and maintaining the 2002 fiscal positions.
All scenarios assume the real GDP growth rates suggested by the countries’
PEPs. For 2005, Hungary comes quite close to the 60 percent ratio in all
scenarios and breaches it in the scenario maintaining its 2002 fiscal position.
All other new member states have comfortable cushions in this regard,
suggesting that public debt is not a serious impediment for an early entry into
EMU. The Czech Republic is the only country coming close to the 60 percent
ratio with its PEP target in 2015. With the large deficit realized in 2003, its
position is now probably even more precarious; Hungary and the Slovak
Republic would breach the 60 percent ratio in 2015 by maintaining their
current fiscal stances. For these three countries, the study illustrates that, for
countries with relatively weak fiscal discipline coming from benign starting
positions, the debt criterion creates an incentive to seek an early EMU entry.
To check the robustness of the results, the study also takes the average growth
rate from 1999 to 2004 as the relevant one from 2005 onwards. The results
remain qualitatively similar.
Since there is nothing special about a debt burden of 60 percent, the study also
asks what fiscal adjustments would be necessary to maintain the current debt
ratios stable. Table 8 gives the results for different assumptions regarding real
GDP growth and real interest rates. A combination of low growth and high
real interest rates would pose considerable challenges for the Czech and
24 Public Finance: Size, Structure and Consolidation
14 For a detailed description of the EDP and the SGP, see Fatas et al. (2003).
15 Note that the 1995 values refer to national data reported in Gleich and von Hagen (2001),
while the 2001 data are from European Commission (2003a) and comply with EU accounting
rules, and 2004 data are from the 2004 Spring Economic Forecasts.
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pressure, but still leave a need for fiscal tightening in the same countries. Only
Estonia and Slovenia have room for lasting fiscal expansions if they wish to
maintain their current debt burdens. Orban and Szapary (2004) present
a similar exercise asking for the primary-balance adjustment necessary in
each country to reach a debt-GDP ratio of 40 percent by 2013. They find that
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Malta need significant
improvements in their deficits from their current fiscal positions.
Figure 6: Public Debt Ratios
Source: Own calculations
Turning to annual fiscal deficits reveals a less rosy picture. Figure 7 plots the
deficit-GDP ratios of the new member states from 1997 on. In the CEE
countries, deficits sharply increased in the wake of the Asian and Russian
currency crises, 1998–1999. But the figure reveals important differences in
their fiscal management thereafter. The Baltic states and Slovenia quickly
managed to bring their deficits close to balance, reaching levels well below
three percent in 2002. For these countries, the flow constraint does not pose
a threat to an early EMU membership.
In contrast, the deficit developments seem rather unstable in the Czech and
Slovak Republics and in Hungary. The big increase in the Hungarian deficit
in 2002 points to the importance of electoral cycle effects on fiscal policy.
16
The sustained, positive trends in the deficit ratios in the Slovak Republic,
Hungary and, to a lesser extent, Poland and the high level of that ratio in the
Czech Republic cast doubts on the commitment of the governments to their
16 See Hallerberg and Vinhas de Souza (2002) for a study of political business cycles in CEE
countries.
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three-percent limit. This is also true for Cyprus and Malta.
Actual deficits are affected by both policy choices and endogenous responses
of tax revenues and expenditures to changes in GDP. It is useful to separate
these two in order to get a better picture of the policy choices. To do that, we
apply a simplified version of the growth-accounting approach proposed by
von Hagen et al. (2001, 2002). Let dt be the deficit ratio in year t, i.e., the
difference between general government spending and current revenues over
GDP, and let Yt be real GDP. We define the contribution of real GDP growth
to the change in the budget deficit as
(3)
This is the change in the deficit that would have resulted with no change in
the spending and revenue ratios between the two years. Using (3), we define
the fiscal impulse in period t as
(4)
Thus, an active fiscal policy is one that results in a change in the deficit ratio
which is not due to real GDP growth. A positive number indicates an
expansionary fiscal impulse, while a negative number indicates a fiscal
contraction.
17
Figure 7: General Government Budget Deficits
Source: Own calculations
26 Public Finance: Size, Structure and Consolidation
17 Note that the acceding states have completed at most one business cycle since the beginning
of the transition period. This means that reliable estimates of cyclical elasticities of budgetary
aggregates are not yet available.
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Source: Own calculations
Figure 8 plots the annual fiscal impulses for the 10 new member states from
1998 to 2004.
18 In 1998–99, fiscal impulses were expansionary in all CEE
countries except Poland, indicating a discretionary, counter-cyclical response
to the economic weakening resulting from the Russian and Asian crises.
When growth revived in 2000, the Baltic states quickly switched to
contractionary fiscal impulses. Lithuania kept this fiscal stance in 2002, while
Estonia and Latvia relaxed their fiscal policies slightly in that year. On
average over the years 2000 to 2004, fiscal policy in the Baltics was slightly
contractionary. Slovenia’s fiscal stance was very similar, resulting in a neutral
average stance over the past five years.
In contrast, the Czech Republic had positive fiscal impulses in 2000 and 2001
and then turned to a neutral fiscal policy. Hungary’s large fiscal impulse in
2002 probably reflects a political business-cycle effect that was sharply
corrected in the following year. Poland’s fiscal policy was expansionary in
2002–2004, though its fiscal impulses were smaller. The Slovak Republic
stands out for a huge fiscal expansion in 2000 followed immediately by
a sharp and large contraction in 2001. Cyprus had strong fiscal expansions in
2001 and 2002, while 2003 saw a strong, negative fiscal impulse.
Malta’s fiscal stance was expansionary in all years since 2000. Malta and
Poland are the only two countries that consistently had an expansionary fiscal
stance over this period; their average impulses reach 0.9 percent of GDP.
18 For the Czech Republic, we take reduce governments spending by expenses connected to an
implicit government guarantee that amounted to 6.3 percent of GDP.
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fiscal performance in the new member states than the debt ratios. Except in
the Baltic states and, perhaps, Slovenia, there is a need for more effective
fiscal management to control annual deficits.
3.3. Quality of Fiscal Adjustments
Successful consolidation of the government budget depends importantly on
the quality of the budgetary adjustments undertaken, with “quality” referring
to the relative contribution of different budgetary items to the adjustment
effort. “Good” fiscal adjustments are marked by a strong emphasis on
expenditure cuts rather than increased revenues, and on tackling those
expenditures that are politically most sensitive like transfers, subsidies, and
wage expenditures (Perotti et al., 1998). A consolidation effort is regarded as
a successful one, if the reduction in the budget deficit lasts for a number of
years. Recent research in this area (Perotti et al. 1998, von Hagen and Strauch,
2001; von Hagen, Strauch, and Hughes Hallett, 2002) shows that successful
consolidations are good consolidations. Perotti et al. (1998) find that spending
cuts contribute at least 70 percent to successful fiscal consolidations in EU
countries. Countries that rely predominantly on raising more taxes to
consolidate their budgets only achieve short-lived deficit reductions.
In Table 8, we report the adjustment patterns in large fiscal expansions and
large fiscal contractions in the new member states from 1999 to 2004. We
define large expansions and contractions as years in which the general
government budget deficit increased or fell by at least one percent of GDP,
respectively.
19 If there are two subsequent years in which the deficit increased
by more than one percent, as in the Slovak Republic in 1999–2000 and in
Hungary 2001–2002, we count both years together as one large fiscal
expansion and report the average annual increase in the deficit ratio. Similarly,
if a country’s deficit ratio fell by more than one percent of GDPin each of two
subsequent years, as in Malta 1999–2000 and Latvia 2000–2001, and Hungary
2003–2004, we count both years as one large fiscal consolidation and report
the average annual decline in the deficit ratio. We compute the contribution of
spending to the expansion by dividing the change in the ratio of general
government spending to GDPby the change in the deficit ratio and multiplying
28 Public Finance: Size, Structure and Consolidation
19 This is larger than the 0.5 percent of GDP criterion applied in studies of fiscal policy for the
OECD. We use a larger cut-off to account for the greater volatility of deficit ratios in the countries
considered.
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or fell by more than the deficit. Anegative number indicates that the spending
and the deficit changed in opposite directions. We call a change in the deficit
expenditure-dominated, if the contribution of spending is at least 50 percent.
There are 16 large fiscal expansions and 14 large consolidations in our data.
The table shows that the average large fiscal expansion resulted in an increase
in the deficit ratio by 2.7 percent of GDP. Increasing expenditure ratios
contributed on average 103.1 percent to large fiscal expansions; this average
is statistically significantly different from zero. 13 out of the 16 large fiscal
expansions were expenditure dominated. In 10 cases, the change in the
spending ratio accounted for more than 75 percent, in seven cases for more
than 90 percent of the increase in the deficit ratio. Thus, like in the EU
countries analyzed in Perotti et al. (1998), large fiscal expansions are mainly
the consequence of a lack of control over government spending rather than
declining fiscal revenues. Only the fiscal expansion in the Slovak Republic
Note: Size indicates the change in the government budget deficit as percent of GDP. Contribution of
spending is the change of the government spending-GDPratio as percent of the change in the deficit
ratio.
Source: Own calculations
Table 8: Quality of Fiscal Adjustments
Fiscal Expansions Fiscal Contractions
Country, year Size Contribution  Country, year Size Contribution
of spending of spending
EE 99 4.4 68.2 CZ 99 –1.0 100.0
HU 99 1.2 50.0 MT 99–00 –1.9 76.3
LV 99 4.6 17.4 CY 00 –2.1 0.0
LT 99 2.7 96.3 EE 00 –4.4 105.5
SK 99–00 3.6 –12.7 HU 00 –2.6 –65.0
CZ 01 1.9 189.5 LV 00–01 –1.9 191.9
HU 01–02 3.2 76.1 LT 00 –3.1 245.5
PL 04 1.7 100.0 SK 01 –6.3 133.3
CY 02 2.2 68.2 EE 02 –1.5 0.0
LV 02 1.1 136.4 HU 03–04 –2.2 111.4
CZ 03 6.5 90.8 SK 03 –2.1 –104.8
MT 03 4.0 35.0 CY 04 –1.7 305.9
CY 03 1.7 282.4 CZ 04 –5.9 118.6
EE 04 1.9 89.5 MT 04 –3.8 –42.1
LT 04 1.1 272.2
PL 04 1.9 89.5
Average 2.7 103.1 –2.9 77.8
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an increasing deficit ratio, i.e. strongly falling revenues.
The average large fiscal consolidation was almost exactly of the same size as
the average large fiscal expansion, an observation Perotti et al. (1998) also
report for the incumbent EU countries. On average, 77.8 percent of large
consolidations were due to cuts in government spending; again, this average
is statistically significantly different from zero and it is very close to the
70 percent reported by Perotti et al. (1998) for the incumbent EU countries.
There are nine “good quality” fiscal consolidations in this data. The
consolidations in Hungary (2000), the Slovak Republic (2003) and Malta
(2004) are noteworthy for combining a rising spending ratio with a fall in the
deficit ratio, i.e. a strong increase in the tax burden.
We can check the “success” of the consolidations occurring between 1999 and
2002. Aconsolidation is defined as successful, if the deficit ratio in the second
year after the consolidation does not exceed the deficit ratio in the year of the
consolidation by more than one percent. This is true for the consolidations in
Malta (1999–2000), Estonia (2000), Latvia (2000–2001), Lithuania (2000),
and Slovakia (2001). In contrast, the consolidations in the Czech Republic
(1999), Cyprus (2000), Hungary (2000), and Estonia (2002) were not
successful according to this criterion. Even though this evidence is limited,
we can use a Chi-square test to check the hypothesis that “good” fiscal
consolidations are more likely to be successful than “bad” ones. Putting the
data into a 2-by-2 contingency table yields a test statistic Q = 5.63, which is
larger than the Chi-square with one degree of freedom for a probability limit
of 5 percent (3.8). Thus, scant as it is, the data support the hypothesis that
consolidations based on expenditure cuts rather than increasing revenues are
more likely to produce lasting reductions in the deficit ratio.
In sum, the evidence indicates that weak fiscal discipline in the new member
states is primarily connected with weak control over government spending,
and that efforts to reign in deficits must concentrate on cutting government
spending. This is consistent with our earlier observation that the public
sectors in the new member states tend to be too large.
3.4. The Role of Budgeting Institutions
A growing body of theoretical and empirical research shows the importance
of the design of the government budget process for solving this externality
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20 The budget process consists
of the formal and informal rules governing budgetary decisions within the
executive and the legislative branches of government, including the rules
relating to the formulation of a budget by the executive, to its passage through
the legislature, and to its implementation by the executive. The budget
process can serve its purpose effectively only if all conflicts between
competing claims on public finances are indeed resolved within its scope.
Four deviations from this principle undermine its functioning: the use of
off-budget funds, which allow policy makers to circumvent the constraints of
the budget process and remove decisions altogether from being challenged by
conflicting distributional interests, “non-decisions,” which occur, when
expenditures included in the budget are determined by developments
exogenous to the budget process, e.g., by the indexation of spending
programs,
21 “mandatory spending laws”, i.e., non-financial laws that make
certain government expenditures compulsory and the budget a mere summary
of spending mandates created by simple legislation, and contingent liabilities
such as guarantees for liabilities of public or non-public entities. The 2002
PEPs indicate that these deviations are still important in most new member
states.
22
Political economy suggests that the proper design of the budget process
depends strongly on the form of government (Hallerberg and von Hagen,
1999). For multi-party coalition governments, which are the norm in the CEE
countries, the appropriate institutional design of the budget process conforms
to the “contract model” (Hallerberg and von Hagen, 1999), which focuses on
binding fiscal targets for total spending and the main spending aggregates
fixed early in the budget process by a joint agreement among all members of
the cabinet. These fiscal targets should be anchored on medium-term fiscal
programs laid down in the coalition agreements. Their implementation should
be safeguarded by a strong supervisory role of the finance ministry in the
execution of the budget, clear and effective rules for expenditure management
and rules for dealing with revenue windfalls and unexpected shortfalls.
20 See von Hagen (2003) for a review of the literature.
21 Setting the relevant parameters of entitlement programs is part of the annual budget process
in several countries. Another approach, used in Denmark, is to set cash limits on welfare
appropriations and require the relevant minister to propose spending adjustments and changes in
the relevant non-financial laws if these limits are overrun (von Hagen and Harden, 1994.)
22 See also European Commission (2003c)
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Source: Own calculations
Figure 10: Budget Processes and Debt Ratios
Source: Own calculations
Gleich (2002) studies the budget processes of 10 CEE countries and develops
an index of institutional quality ranging from zero to 10, where a higher
number indicates a better quality. Figure 9 shows the values of this index for
the 10 CEE countries in the mid-1990s and in 2001. Estonia, Latvia, and
Slovenia, had the best institutions, Hungary the weakest ones. Figure 10 plots
the institutional index against the debt-GDP ratio and shows that countries
with good institutions managed to maintain low debt ratios. The regression
32 Public Finance: Size, Structure and Consolidation
4_2006  14/12/06  15:36  Stránka 32fitted through the data shows a significant negative correlation between the
quality of budgeting institutions and debt ratios. The rank correlation
coefficient between the institutional index and the debt ratio in 2003 is
r=(–0.83), which is statistically significant from zero at the 5-percent
significance level. Gleich (2002) also uses regression analysis controlling for
economic developments and political characteristics to confirm that better
institutions are conducive to lower deficit ratios in the same countries.
Another way to look at the interaction of fiscal performance and the design of
the budget process is to consider the correlation between the average fiscal
impulses in the years 2000–2004, shown in Figure 8 above, and the
institutional index. The rank correlation coefficient between these two is
r=(–0.69), indicating that countries with better institutions had significantly
less expansionary fiscal impulses during these years. The correlation is
statistically significant at the 5-percent level.
These results suggest that countries can improve their fiscal performance
through institutional reforms of the budget process. While Poland has made
considerable progress in this regard in the late 1990s, and some reforms are
currently under way in the Slovak Republic (see the 2002 PEPs), more efforts
seem necessary especially in Hungary. Importantly, the new member states
will have the opportunity to use the framework of the SGP to improve their
budget processes. Like the contract approach, this framework focuses on
annual fiscal targets embedded in medium-term fiscal plans. The SGP,
therefore, gives an external reinforcement to domestic budget institutions in
countries, where the contract approach is appropriate. Empirical research for
the incumbent EU members shows that states that conform to this model have
indeed consistently improved their domestic budget processes in recent years
by tying them closely into the framework of the SGP (Hallerberg, Strauch,
von Hagen 2001). They have also consistently met their fiscal targets, reduced
their debt ratios and stayed within the limits of the EDP. In contrast, Germany,
France, and Italy, which have now breached the limits of the EDP for several
years, do not conform to the contract model of the budget process. Based on
this experience, one can expect that fiscal discipline in the new CEE member
countries will be strengthened by the SGP. Similar reasoning applies to Malta
but not to Cyprus, which is a presidential democracy.
The move to EMU will add further disciplinary pressure on fiscal policy.
Gosh et al. (1998) and Fatás and Rose (2001) in a large cross-section study,
argue that countries adopting currency boards or multilateral currency unions
have significantly larger budget surpluses than countries with less restrictive
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governments to live without recourse to central bank financing and to avoid
excessive fiscal risks. Thus, giving up monetary policy autonomy induces
more fiscal discipline at least in small open economies, which dominate the
currency-board and monetary-union sample in their study. In an empirical
study of fiscal policy in the CEE countries, Grigonyte (2004a) finds a similar
result. Countries that adopted currency boards had significantly higher budget
surpluses during the 1990s and early 2000s. Her result is particularly
interesting for our context, because it holds up after controlling for the quality
of the budget process.
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As expected from rapidly growing, small open economies with high
investment rates, the new member states have experienced large current
account deficits in recent years. Table 9 reports the average deficits in relation
to GDP in the years 2000–2003. Estonia and Latvia stand out with deficits
exceeding eight percent of GDP, Lithuania and Hungary follow with deficits
of 5.6 percent of GDP and the Czech Republic with 5.1 percent. The picture
in Malta is different, because its relatively large current account deficit of 6.2
percent of GDP is accompanied neither by similar growth rates nor
investment rates as in these four countries. While the Czech current account
deficit has not been supported by high growth rates in recent years, either, it
does come with a high investment rate. Only Slovenia has kept its current
account close to balance on average in recent years. As most new member
states have experienced sizeable real appreciations of their currencies in
recent years, their large current account deficits are not an indication of weak
currencies; instead, they reflect the large capital inflows these countries have
attracted in recent years.
The table also reports the capital inflows experienced by the new member
states over the period from 2000 to 2003 and the type of financing. All
35
Notes:All entries are averages of annual rates in percent of GDP. Capital inflows include errors and
omissions. Investment figures are net. Czech Republic and Poland: 2000–2002, Slovak Republic:
2000.
Source: International Financial Statistics, European Commission
Table 9: External Performance 2000–2003
Country Current Capital  Direct  Portfolio Other  Gross Foreign
Account Inflows Investment Investment Investment Foreign Debt  / 
Balance Debt Exports
Cyprus –4.2 6.4 1.5 –1.2 5.1 70.0 1.27
Czech Republic –5.1 9.9 8.9 –0.8 –0.8 26.6 0.41
Estonia –8.8 9.9 5.4 1.4 2.6 30.0 0.37
Hungary –5.6 5.6 2.2 2.6 0.3 44.6 0.65
Latvia –8.4 9.6 3.8 –1.9 7.2 46.4 1.02
Lithuania –5.6 7.9 3.2 1.5 2.4 24.8 0.50
Malta –6.2 9.1 5.2 –19.7 20.2 135.8 1.49
Poland –3.9 4.1 4.4 1.3 –1.8 22.1 0.77
Slovak Republic –3.4 8.0 10.0 4.0 6.8 n.a. n.a.
Slovenia –0.4 7.9 4.3 0.1 3.1 30.8 0.31
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this period. To put the size of the capital flows into perspective, we compare
them with the experience of some incumbent member states with large capital
inflows in the past 20 years, see Table 10. The experience of Greece, Ireland,
Portugal and Spain is interesting, because these were countries that were
catching up with the older EU members at the time. It is clear that the average
capital inflows experienced by the Baltic countries, Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Slovenia, and Malta are “large” compared to the experience of these
countries.
The sustainability of persistent, large current account deficits depends in part
on the type of capital inflows to finance these deficits, as portfolio investment
is commonly thought to be more fickle than direct investment.
23 A high share
of direct investment, therefore, results in less exposure to sudden reversals of
capital flows which might occur due to changing expectations and investor
confidence in the international capital market.
24 Table 11 shows that there are
some striking differences in the type of financing among the new member
states. In the Czech Republic, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia net
foreign direct investment exceeded the current account deficits substantially.
In Malta, net foreign investment inflows almost match the current account
deficits. The other states, in contrast, took recourse to portfolio and other
36 Coping With Large Capital Inflows
Table 10: Large Capital Inflows in Incumbent Countries
Country Years of Large  Average Capital Inflows 
Capital Inflows (percent of GDP)
Italy 1987–90 2.0
1987–91 5.4
Portugal 1996–99 5.9
1987–91 4.5
Spain 1996–97 3.0
1986–88 4.5
Greece 1998–99 6.0
1986–88 2.3
Ireland 1993 1.9
1995 0.9
1998 1.2
Source: Begg et al. (2003)
23As Buiter and Grafe (2002) point out, even foreign direct investment can be quickly reversed
if there are well developed markets for equity and corporate securities.
24 Note, however, that even foreign direct investment inflows could be reversed quickly, if
foreign investors can sell their assets in liquid domestic securities or equities markets. (Buiter and
Grafe, 2003).
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Lithuania, the two countries operating currency boards in this group, have
relatively low shares of foreign direct investment in financing their current
account deficits. This suggests that the credibility of a hard peg is not the
principal factor in determining the financing conditions.
Table 11 also reports the gross foreign debt positions of the same countries at
the end of 2001, measured in terms of GDP. Malta and Cyprus stand out for
relatively large foreign debts, while foreign debt ratios remain well below
50 percent in the other countries. But relating foreign debt to the annual
volume of exports shows that Latvia also has a relatively large foreign debt
burden.
The prospect of further, large capital inflows will be an important factor
shaping the macro economic policies of the new member states in the years
to come. As Lipschitz et al. (2002) and Lipschitz (2004) note, the CEE
countries in particular are rich in well-trained labor and poor in capital
compared to their main trading partners, implying that the marginal product
of capital is relatively high in the new member states. Table 11 reports some
estimates of the marginal product of capital relative to Germany in the new
member states. Following Lipschitz et al. (2002), these calculations are based
on the assumption of Cobb-Douglas production functions with a capital
elasticity of 1/3 and equal total factor productivities in all countries.
25 In 1996,
the largest relative marginal products of capital estimated in this way
prevailed in the Baltic countries, followed by Poland. In Hungary, and the
Czech Republic, marginal products of capital were about 4–5 times larger
than in Germany, in Slovenia and Cyprus about three times. Since the
mid-1990s, these ratios have declined dramatically, reflecting the rapid
productivity growth.
25 Let yi = Ai (ki)
α be output per employed worker in country i, with ki the capital labor ratio,
Ai total factor productivity, and α = 1/3  the capital elasticity. The marginal product of capital is
MPCi = αAi(ki)
–(1–α). The capital labor ratios are computed using output in PPP dollars from the
World Economic Outlook 2004 data base and labor force and unemployment data from the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators.
Source: Own estimates
Table 11: Marginal Product of Capital (Multiple of German MPC)
CY CZ EE HU LV LT MT PL SK SI
1996 2.76 4.17 10.35 4.87 16.36 9.95 1.51 8.07 6.08 2.8 7
2002 2.23 4.08 6.03 3.88 9.80 6.74 1.34 5.48 4.33 2.15
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a dramatic improvement in the institutional framework of these economies,
which, in macro economic terms, can be interpreted as a rise in total factor
productivity adding to the gap in the marginal product of capital in favor of
the new member states.
26 Furthermore, EU membership implies a higher
degree of legal certainty for investors, which induces a reduction in
country-risk premia. Note that the last two arguments also apply to Cyprus
and Malta. Based on these considerations, Lipschitz estimates the cumulated
potential future capital inflows between 65 percent (Slovenia) and 596
percent of GDP (Lithuania.)
27 Obviously, these estimates must be taken
cautiously given model uncertainty and potential limits of supply.
28
Furthermore, the inflows will be distributed over time. The main point,
however, is that capital inflows are likely to remain large in the foreseeable
future. Other factors contribute to this tendency (Begg et al., 2003). One is the
relatively low level of financial development of the former socialist
economies, which limits the extent to which capital investments are financed
from domestic sources. Another one is the likely increase in the demand for
money as inflation expectations continue to fall. Given the limited size of
domestic securities markets, much of that increase will likely be
accommodated by an inflow of foreign reserves at the central bank.
Large capital inflows are, of course, desirable in principle for relatively
low-income countries, because they induce an efficient international
allocation of capital and they push the receiving countries’ consumption and
investment frontier outside, allowing for more investment and higher
consumption levels at the same time, and speeding up the growth and real
convergence process. However, they also pose potential risks from two sides:
overheating and volatility.
The first risk is that of the (in)famous convergence play, a combination of real
appreciation and declining long-term interest rates due to falling inflation
expectations and country-risk premia, which makes the economies even more
attractive for short-term capital inflows and portfolio investment. If the
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26 IMF (2003) presents empirical evidence showing that institutional quality affects economic
growth. Studying growth patterns in transition economies, Grogan and Moers (2001) find that
institutional improvements lead to higher growth and stronger foreign direct investment. Alfaro et
al. (2003) find that, in a sample of 50 countries, institutional weakness is an important hindrance
against capital inflows to poor countries.
27 Lipschitz does not give estimates for Cyprus and Malta.
28 Jonas (2004) notes that global capital flows to emerging market economies have surged in
2003, but predicts that they will be reduced in the coming years.
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be absorbed by large trade deficits. In practice, as witnessed by the
experiences of Italy, Spain, and Portugal in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
convergence play fuels domestic demand for non-tradables, too, where
domestic supply is limited, and this leads to a severe overheating of the
economy with new inflationary pressures. With a fixed exchange rate, the
increase in the price level leads to a real appreciation of the domestic
currency. With a floating rate, the central bank can do more to suppress
inflationary pressures and let the nominal exchange rate appreciate.
These conventional demand effects may be augmented by financial market or
balance sheet effects (see Calvo 2002, 2003, Calvo et al. 1999, 2004). Calvo
and Reinhart (1999) call this the Fisherian channel of the transmission of
capital inflows. The real appreciation of the home currency induces a rise in
the relative price of non-tradables, the more so, the more the central bank tries
to stabilize the nominal exchange rate. As a result, producers of non-tradables
face a lower ex-post real interest rate and rising cash-flows that raise the value
of their assets that can be collateralized against bank loans. Large capital
inflows are, therefore, often connected to asset and real estate price bubbles
fuelling credit booms. To the extent that they are absorbed by an expansion of
international reserves at the central bank, the ensuing monetary expansion
contributes to this development. We can assess this risk by looking at recent
growth rates of broad money and credit in the new member states, see table12.
The table reports the average growth rates of broad real money and real
domestic credit between 1999 and 2003. To put them in perspective, we
Table 12: Annual Average Real Money and Credit Growth, 1999–2003
Real Money Growth Less  Real Domestic Credit Growth 
Real Output Growth Less Real Output Growth
Cyprus 7.7 8.2
Czech Republic 6.4 –1.1
Estonia 14.0 18.5
Hungary 10.2 7.2
Latvia 13.2 28.0
Lithuania 11.3 12.2
Malta 5.8 4.5
Poland 6.7 6.3
Slovak Republic 7.3 –1.2
Slovenia 12.5 13.5
Notes: Average annual growth rates of broad money and domestic credit. Malta: 1999–2002.
Source: IMF, own calculations based on International Financial Statistics
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two groups emerging in this table: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Malta,
Poland, and the Slovak Republic, which had growth rates of real money
exceeding real GDP growth by 6–8 percent, and Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, and Slovenia, where this difference exceeded 10 percent. Falling
rates of interest and inflation expectations may have caused a decline in the
equilibrium velocity of money. If the income elasticity of the demand for
money exceeds one, strong real GDP growth adds another explanation. Thus,
real money growth rates of 6–8 percent annually may not be excessive.
However, the strong monetary expansions in the second group raise a warning
flag. Turning to credit growth, the ongoing process of financial market
development leads one to expect that credit is growing fast in the new
member states. Nevertheless, the table indicates four countries with clear
signs of a strong credit boom, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia.
Taking money and credit growth rates together, they seem to be the critical
cases in the group. This is interesting because, in the past, these four countries
also put the largest weight on stabilizing the exchange rate among the
countries in this group (von Hagen and Zhou, 2004; Thimann et al. 2004).
The second risk connected with large capital inflows is their volatility. To date
already, capital inflows to the new member states have been quite volatile.
Table 13 reports the standard deviation of annual capital inflows relative to
GDP between 1994 and 2003. This ratio varied between 2.6 percent of GDP
for Poland and 5.0 percent of GDPfor Hungary. Volatility is large compared to
the average inflows reported in Table 9. The table also shows that several
countries in this group experienced large reversals of capital inflows, Sudden
Stops in the terminology of Calvo and Reinhart (1999). Between 1999 and
40 Coping With Large Capital Inflows
Notes:Standard deviations for Poland and Czech Republic: 1994–2002, for Slovak Republic: 1994–2000.
All entries are in percent of GDP
Source: Own calculations based on International Financial Statistics
Table 13: Volatility of Capital Inflows
Cyprus Czech Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Malta Poland Slovak Slovenia
Republic Republic
Standard Deviation
4.1 4.6 3.6 5.0 5.6 3.0 4.4 2.8 2.6 4.1
Change 1999–2000
–4.2 0.7 0.3 –1.5 –5.4 –2.0 –2.9 –1.4 –1.5 0.9
Largest Capital Inflow Reversal during 1994–2003
–8.2 –11.2 –6.5 –19.9 –5.8  –6.1 –17.2 –3.8  –2.3 –9.9
(2003) (1997) (1997) (1996) (2002) (1999) (1995) (2001) (1997) (2003)
4_2006  14/12/06  15:36  Stránka 402000, capital inflows slowed down in seven of the ten countries, the exceptions
being the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Slovenia. Between 1994 and 2003,
eight of the ten countries experienced at least one year in which capital inflows
declined by more than five percent of GDP, four experienced a decline of
(almost) 10 percent or more. This confirms Calvo and Reinhart’s (1999)
observation that large capital inflows are often been followed by sudden stops
and reversals. Except for Poland and the Slovak Republic, the reversals
reported in Table 13 easily qualify as large compared to the evidence reported
by Calvo and Reinhart. Obviously, they have affected countries with very
different exchange rate regimes, supporting Calvo’s (2003) argument that
exchange rate policies are of secondary importance to the incidence of sudden
stops. Note also, that the largest reversals occurred around the year 2000, which
confirms the observation in Calvo and Reinhart (1999) and Calvo et al. (2004)
that sudden stops are bunched in time and across countries.
Sudden stops create macro economic problems through the same channels
discussed above in reverse (Calvo and Reinhart, 1999). Asudden stop requires
acontraction of the current account deficit or the money supply or both, leading
to a contraction in aggregate demand. The ensuing real depreciation of the
currency entails a drop in the relative price of non-tradables. Producers of
non-tradables now face higher ex-post real interest rates and lower values of
their assets than anticipated, including those assets they can use as collateral
for borrowing from banks. Banks react to the resulting deterioration in the
quality of their loans by cutting back lending. The resulting credit crunch
makes the recession more pronounced and longer lasting. In principle, this
financial effect could be avoided by a large nominal depreciation of the
currency. This, however, would increase the burden of foreign currency debt
on the government and the private sector.
Coping with large capital inflows is a difficult task for macro economic
policy. Since the underlying reason is real, there is not much monetary policy
can do. The obvious response would be to tighten monetary policy to prevent
aggregate demand from overheating. With a fixed exchange rate, capital
inflows then lead to a rapid increase in international reserves. The central
bank may try to sterilize their impact on the money supply, but in practice this
is costly and ultimately of limited success. Inflationary pressures then result
in a real appreciation, a loss in international competitiveness, and a widening
current account deficit. With a flexible exchange rate, the central bank may
be more successful to keep inflation low, but at the cost of a nominal
appreciation of the currency, with the same effect on competitiveness and the
current account.
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generate a preference for low exchange rate variability, even if the official
exchange rate regime allows for a high degree of flexibility. This has been
dubbed the fear of floating by recent literature. The reason is that, since
emerging-market countries typically cannot borrow internationally in their
own currency, large capital inflows lead to a mounting stock of foreign debt
denominated in foreign currency. Exchange rate variations then expose the
government and the private sector to fluctuations in their balance sheets.
Hausmann et al. (2001) show that fear of floating is strongly associated with
a country’s borrowing in foreign currency and the degree of exchange rate
volatility it allows.
29 If this is true for the new EU member states, they will
show a tendency for strongly managing their exchange rates as the capital
inflows continue to persist. They may even decide to enter the ERM-2 for that
reason, hoping that it offers more credibility of their commitment to exchange
rate targets. Yet, the comfort offered by an exchange rate peg in this situation
can be quite betraying. As the risk of exchange rate variability seems to be
low, private borrowers and the government are more inclined to borrow in
foreign currencies than they would be otherwise, which increases the
exposure to sudden stops and exchange rate crises. As long as the capital
inflows continue to be large, the exchange rate peg causes a monetary and
credit expansion that aggravates the tendency for overheating. Once the
capital flows dry out, the peg may come under speculative attacks, which,
unless they can be successfully defended, are costly and more disruptive than
the adjustment under a floating rate.
The ERM-2 may offer some relief and credibility in such a situation due to
the financial support for interventions it provides, but the history of the early
1990s suggests that its usefulness is limited at best. The experience teaches
that European exchange rates tend to become objects of politics, especially in
situations of market tensions. The countries exposed to convergence play
failed to adjust their exchange rates timely in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
which contributed to the size of the later devaluations and currency crises.
When Germany asked for a revaluation of the DM to absorb the
post-unification capital inflows, other governments and central banks were
unwilling to grant the adjustment. It is not clear a priori, that the new member
states would not see similar resistance against repeated devaluations of the
Euro against their currencies, which might be required to counteract
42 Coping With Large Capital Inflows
29Arecent paper by Detken and Gaspar (2004) shows that fear of floating could also stem from
the combination of inflation targeting and a specific monetary-policy rule in a new-Keynesian
model.
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membership. Thus, the multilateral nature of the ERM-2 does not obviously
add to its economic rationality. It is equally uncertain that the multilateral
political negotiations required for devaluations can be completed fast enough
in the case of a sudden stop. The multilateral political framework may, in
contrast, create ambiguities and rumours in the markets, which could
undermine the credibility of the pegs.
Since a sudden stop of capital inflows is equivalent to a cut in international
credit to the home economy, the appropriate response by the central bank
would be to expand credit to the private sector. This could be done through
open market operations or loans to the banking system under a flexible
exchange rate and entail a nominal depreciation of the currency. The latter
also reduces the need for the relative price of non-tradables to fall, but
increases the domestic value of the foreign debt burden on the government
and the private sector to the extent that foreign debt is denominated in foreign
currency. Maintaining an exchange rate peg, in contrast, avoids the valuation
effect, but the loss of international reserves at the central bank leads to
a monetary contraction that makes the credit crunch more severe. Thus,
sudden stops create a monetary policy dilemma. As recent literature has
noted, Euroization offers a partial way out of this dilemma.
30 First, it
eliminates the valuation effect on the affected country’s debt denominated in
Euros. Second, the supply of bank credit would not be limited by the domestic
central bank’s supply of bank reserves but by the ESCB’s supply of bank
reserves. This would make any the credit contraction less severe, as monetary
policy would not add to it. As a result, countries facing large (and volatile)
capital inflows should have a preference for either floating exchange rates or
Euroization, but avoid soft pegs, especially if, as in the case of the ERM-2,
they are unprotected by capital controls.
Fiscal policy is the more appropriate policy instrument for dealing with
capital flows. In the face of large inflows, tightening the fiscal stance helps
reduce the risk of an overheating economy. Here, again, the quality of the
fiscal adjustment matters. If tightening is achieved by raising tax rates, the
result would be buoyant tax revenues and, therefore, a strong temptation to
expand fiscal spending. At the same time, initiatives to cut spending in the
face of a strong economy will not be very popular. Furthermore, Calvo (2003)
points out that, by raising distortionary taxes, the government may reduce the
Coping With Large Capital Inflows 43
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it is important to achieve tightening by cutting government expenditures
rather than raising taxes. This makes the role of good budgeting institutions
especially important. Effective spending controls and medium-term fiscal
targets well anchored in the planning and implementation procedures will be
important to achieve a sufficient degree of fiscal discipline and use fiscal
policy to manage capital inflows.
31
As most of the new member states need to tighten their fiscal policies to meet
the requirements of EMU, managing capital inflows and meeting these
requirements are complementary goals for them. However, the countries with
the tightest fiscal stance in recent years are also the countries with the
strongest credit expansions. For them, as for the others in the future, further
tightening to fend off the macro economic effects of large capital inflows may
be asking too much of fiscal policy (Jonas, 2004).
There is also a task here for prudential supervision and banking regulation
involved in managing large capital inflows. Recent empirical studies show
that large credit booms and strong real appreciations are among the best
indicators of the risk of currency and banking crises.
32 Banking regulation can
help to prevent capital inflows from spilling over into domestic credit booms
(Begg et al., 2003.) Strict rules against overlending and overexposure to
individual borrowers are one important element. As lending booms are often
triggered by bubbles in real estate prices, limits on the use of real estate as
collateral can serve as another element of protecting the banking system
against adverse developments. Furthermore, currency mismatch in the
aggregate balance sheet of the banking sector has been an important part in
the link between banking problems and currency crises in recent years.
Systemic risk arising from large exposure to international interest rate shocks
or sudden capital outflows may not be visible in individual bank balance
sheets even when it is in the aggregate balance sheet. Monitoring the entire
banking sector’s financial position is, therefore, an important part of banking
supervision in the new member states.
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31 Kopits (2000) also notes the usefulness of credible medium-term fiscal plans (rules in his
terminology) to avert currency crises in emerging-market economies.
32 For banking crises see Borio et al. (2004) and Ho and von Hagen (2004). For currency crises
see Kaminsky and Reinhardt (1999).
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Entry into EMU requires participation in the ERM-2 for at least 2 years. The
ERM-2 features a central parity against the Euro, standard fluctuation bands
of +/– 15 percent around this parity, compulsory interventions at the margins,
the availability of very short-term financing for interventions, and the absence
of any capital controls to protect the mechanism against speculative attacks.
33
The ECB has the right to suspend interventions in support of weak currencies,
if its goal of price stability is jeopardized otherwise. Since there is no formal
definition of what this means, markets will never be fully assured of the
ECB’s commitment to defend the exchange rate bands. Participating
countries may choose narrower bands than the standard ones as unilateral
commitments, i.e., with no obligation to defend them for the ECB. In
particular, the currency boards against the Euro would continue to be
considered as unilateral commitments. The ERM-2 allows for changes in the
central parities and the width of the bands of fluctuations in a cooperative
procedure involving the ECB, the national central banks, the finance
ministers, and the Commission. All parties to the mutual agreement have the
right to initiate the procedure to change central rates.
5.1. The ERM-2: Boot Camp or Purgatory?
The experience of the original ERM in the early 1990s and of the numerous
currency crises in the 1980s and 1990s teaches that soft pegs with no
protection from capital controls like the ERM-2 are inherently unstable, as
changes in the markets’ perception of the credibility of the peg can trigger
large and swift capital outflows. In one sense, this is good, because it subjects
monetary and fiscal policy to the scrutiny of international investors and the
risk of a currency crisis caused by flawed domestic policies exerts heavy
disciplinary pressure on the governments. Empirical research into the causes
of currency crises suggests they are indeed linked to weak macro economic
fundamentals like high inflation, excessive credit growth, large budget
deficits and external deficits, as well variables that may have a role in
self-fulfilling crises like unemployment or banking-system fragility (e.g.
45
33 The latter is part of the Single Market framework and applies to all EU member states
independently of the ERM-2. The Treaty allows for temporary limitations under specific,
exceptional circumstances.
4_2006  14/12/06  15:36  Stránka 45Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz 1995, Goldfajn and Valdes 1997, Kaminsky
and Reinhart 1999). Economists from the IMF (Schadler et al. 2004) and the
ECB (Thimann et al. 2004) concur with ECB officials
34 and former EU
Commissioner Solbes (2003) that the ERM-2 creates strong incentives for
consistent macro economic policies. Hochreiter and Tavlas (2004b) and
Papaspyrou (2004) stress the importance of consistent macro economic
policies to build the credibility that facilitated Austria’s and the
Greece’s entries into EMU via the ERM and the ERM-2. In this view, the
ERM-2 is a policy-makers’ boot camp, training them for sound domestic
policies aiming at macro economic stability.
If this view were correct, one would expect that participants in ERM-type
arrangements conduct better macro economic policies than countries with
floating exchange rates. Unfortunately, empirical research has very little to
offer to support that view. The literature of the early 1990s has shown
extensively, that the original ERM did not contribute to better macro
economic policies in the member states compared to countries maintaining
floating exchange rates (Fratianni and von Hagen, 1990, 1992). Low-inflation
discipline was weaker, disinflation took longer and, from the early
1980s onwards, unemployment rates were higher in the countries
participating in the ERM except Germany. Perhaps, this was the case because
undisciplined policies were still protected by capital controls. However, De
Grauwe and Schnabl (2004) find no evidence that hard and intermediate pegs
regimes lead to lower inflation among European transition economies. Fatás
and Rose (2001) and Grigonyte (2004a) find no evidence that soft pegs lead
to more fiscal discipline than floating exchange rates, although very hard pegs
and unilateral monetary unions do.
The main problem with the boot-camp view of the ERM-2 is that it relies
heavily on the assumption that financial markets always act rationally and
based on sound assessments of every country’s individual circumstances.
There is ample evidence throwing doubts on that assumption. The relevance
of non-rational behavior such as herding effects in foreign exchange markets
and crisis contagion has been amply documented in the literature (e.g.,
Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz 1995). Grigonyte (2004b) finds that the risk
premia contained in foreign-currency denominated debt issued by the Baltic
states increased significantly during the Russian crisis in 1998, although their
fiscal performance did not deteriorate dramatically. Similarly, Bernoth et al.
(2004), Grigonyte (2004b), and Favero and Giavazzi (2004) find that default
46 Convergence to the Euro and the ERM-2
34 see the quotes in Thimann et al. (2004)
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significantly affected by swings in the degree of risk aversion in the
international capital market. This implies that interest rates may sharply
increase and a currency peg may come under attack due to a sudden increase
in risk aversion in the international debt market unrelated to domestic
fundamentals. Calvo (2002) points to informational and institutional
deficiencies of international capital markets that explain the contagion of
sudden stops and currency crises. As noted above, sudden stops tend to be
bunched in time, and they have affected countries with very different macro
economic fundamentals. To the extent that currency crises and sudden stops
arise in situations characterized by multiple equilibria, macro economic data
will not provide clear warning signals (Calvo 2003). All this implies that
sound domestic macro policies are not enough to rule out currency crises. The
logical flaw of the boot-camp view of the ERM-2 therefore is that it mistakes
a necessary for a sufficient condition for exchange rate stability. The
alternative view is that the ERM-2 is a “purgatory” imposing the risk of
unnecessary and potentially large damage on countries before they enter
EMU (Buiter and Grafe, 2002). In this view, countries should be allowed to
enter EMU as soon as they fulfil the inflation and fiscal sustainability
requirements, i.e., the ERM-2 requirement should be scratched (Buiter, 2004).
Where one comes down between the boot-camp and the purgatory views of
the ERM-2 is, ultimately, a matter of allocating macro economic risk.
Neglecting the risk of financial market crises hitting small open economies
with sound fundamentals is easy for incumbent EU authorities, because the
economic fall-outs of speculative attacks and financial crises would be borne
by the new member states rather than themselves. They insist on the ERM-2
requirement because they do not wish to see the discipline and quality of
EMU monetary policy diluted by potentially less stability-oriented
members.
35 Neglecting the disciplinary potential of the boot camp is easy for
policymakers in the new member states, who rightly fear the cost of financial
crises and do not consider themselves as being less stability-oriented. In the
end, therefore, the issue is a distributional one, i.e., it is about who carries
more macro economic risk before the new member states enter EMU.
If immediate Euro-adoption is not allowed, the best strategy for the new
member states is to minimize the time spent in the ERM-2, i.e. to enter the
system no sooner than two years before the planned convergence assessment.
Convergence to the Euro and the ERM-2 47
35 This is a kind of replay of the policy debate among the current EMU member countries in
the early and mid-1990s. See e.g., Alesina and Grilli (1993) and Fratianni and von Hagen (1992).
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mainly on each country’s ability to achieve and maintain a large degree of
monetary stability based on its own currency. For the larger countries, Poland
and the Czech Republic, there is a plausible potential for monetary policy to
be effective in that regard.
36 For the smaller countries, that potential is
virtually non-existent. For them, keeping a national currency with a fixed
exchange rate is a dangerous luxury (Buiter and Grafe, 2002; Buiter, 2004).
They would do best entering the ERM-2 immediately, working hard to meet
the entry requirements and adopting the Euro in 2006. The two other
countries could continue their regimes of inflation targeting without much
regard to exchange rate management until they have achieved sufficient
degrees of fiscal sustainability and low inflation rates.
37
5.2. Converging Towards the Euro
To analyze the macro economic issues involved in the passage to the Euro, it
is useful to consider the standard monetary model of the exchange rate. The
fundamental relationship of this model holds that the exchange rate at any
point in time, t, depends on a stochastic fundamental, x(t), and the expected
change in the exchange rate,
(5)
where Et(.) denotes the conditional expectation at time t, and α > 0. Suppose
that the monetary authorities announce the conversion of the currency into the
Euro at some future date T. Then the exchange rate path becomes
(6)
where Etct is the expected conversion rate of the national currency into the
Euro applied at time T. The first term in equation (6) shows that the expected
conversion rate anchors the exchange rate, while the second term represents
the impact of the fundamentals until the time of conversion. Note that
(7)
48 Convergence to the Euro and the ERM-2
36 Cf. Orlowksi (2000).
37 While an official position of “benign neglect” of the exchange rate would contradict the rule of
the European Treaty that EU member states regard their exchange rates as matters of common concern,
the examples of Sweden and the UK suggest that de facto such a policy is acceptable in the EU.
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rate and the expected fundamentals. As the conversion date comes closer,
forward-looking speculation drives the exchange rate towards the announced
conversion rate until it converges to this rate at time T. Furthermore, assuming
that the fundamental x(t) follows a Brownian motion without drift and
conditional variance σ
2
x, the instantaneous variance of the exchange rate along
the path (6) is,
(8)
which declines steadily as t approaches T. The inequality in (8) says that the
announcement of afully credible conversion rate cTgenerates avolatility benefit
in the sense that it stabilizes the exchange rate on the way to the conversion date.
No central bank intervention is necessary to make that happen. As Wilfling and
Maennig (2001) show in a similar model, uncertainty about the date of
conversion adds to the exchange rate volatility during the run-up to the
conversion date, although the volatility is never larger than in a free float.
This model has several policy implications. A first implication is that policy
makers cannot “leave it to the market” to determine the appropriate
conversion rate, a contention that was popular in the run-up to EMU (see
Begg et al., 1997). Suppose, the monetary authorities simply announce that
the conversion rate will be the market equilibrium rate at the time of
conversion, T, i.e., cT = e(T). Letting t approach T, equation (6) then implies
limt→T s(t) = s(T), which is true for any level of the exchange rate. Hence, the
exchange rate at the time of conversion is indeterminate. To avoid
indeterminacy, a conversion rate must be announced.
A second implication is that any change in the expected conversion rate prior
to conversion translates into changes in the exchange rate. Thus, public
statements by the monetary authorities and the governments that change
market expectations about the conversion rate will change the exchange rate
in the run-up to conversion. Once the intention to join the Euro has been
declared, exchange rate movements reflect both fundamentals and the
markets’ perceptions of Euro-adoption politics. Therefore, the actual market
rate is no longer a reliable indicator of the fundamental appropriateness of any
exchange rate, let alone an ERM-2 central parity.
A third implication arises, if the conversion rate is set conditional on the
exchange rate prior to the conversion date. De Grauwe et al. consider linear
rules of the type
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where 0 ≤ λ ≤ 0, w(v) is a weighting function, t ≤ tL ≤ T, and CT = limt→T c(t).
According to equation (9), the conversion rate is the weighted average of
a constant and an average of the realized exchange rate taken over a time
period from tL to T.
38 As De Grauwe et al. (1999) show, this implies that
shocks to the fundamentals x(t) affect the exchange rate in two ways: Once
through the standard impact shown in the second term of equation (6) and
once through the effect on the expected conversion rate. While the details
depend on the specific averaging rule, w(t), the general conclusion is that
such rules make the exchange rate more sensitive to such shocks than in the
presence of a fixed conversion rate.
Fourth, the announcement of the conversion rate by the authorities at time t
*
causes a discrete jump of size Jt* in the exchange rate. Suppose that markets
expected this announcement to happen at time t
* with a subjective probability
γ. The size of the jump due to the announcement can be derived as
(10)
It depends on three elements. First, the more the announcement takes the
markets by surprise, the larger will be the jump. Second, the larger the time-gap
between the announcement date and the conversion date, the smaller will be
the jump. Finally, the larger the gap between the expected conversion rate and
the fundamental at the time of the announcement, the larger is the jump in the
exchange rate. Note that the jump is smaller than indicated in (10) if the
announced conversion date is not fully credible (Wilfling and Maennig, 2001).
Finally, since our model is derived from the standard monetary approach to
the exchange rate, it embeds a solution for the price level during the time until
the Euro is adopted. Let P(t) be the log of the equilibrium price level that
would prevail in the new member state under flexible exchange rates. We
assume that the Euro-area price level is exogenous relative to the price level
in a new member state adopting the Euro. Between the announcement of the
conversion rate and date to the Euro and the adoption of the Euro, the
equilibrium price level follows the following path:
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38 The rule proposed by the first president of the European Monetary Institute, A. Lamfalussy
for the original conversion of the national currencies into the Euro is a special case of this; see
Begg et al. (1997).
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The second equation again makes use of the assumption that the fundamentals
follow a Brownian motion. The second term in equation (11) shows that any
gap between the conversion rate, cT, and the fundamental exchange rate at the
time of adopting the Euro leads to an adjustment in the price level of the new
member states already before the adoption of the Euro. The impact of this gap
on the price level becomes larger, as the time of adopting the Euro comes
closer, i.e., the price level converges smoothly to the value compatible with
equilibrium in the monetary union. In particular, the expectation of a too high
conversion rate – which might seem desirable for the new member state to
gain a competitive edge in the Euro area – only leads to a higher inflation rate
in the time before the Euro is adopted. Since this might defeat the
country’s adoption of the Euro through the inflation criterion, equation (11)
implies that the incentive to go for a high conversion rate is limited. In fact,
equation (11) indicates that countries might even have an incentive to choose
a too low value of the conversion rate to fight domestic inflationary pressures
in the run-up to joining the Euro.
39 Furthermore, the relationship between the
exchange rate and the price level supports the call for an early announcement
of the terms of the Euro adoption, since it gives the economy more time to
adjust prices. Popular fears that locking in the conversion rate too early would
lead to a misalignment of the exchange rate and, therefore, the price level of
the new member state after the adoption of the Euro, overlook the simple fact
that, while the fundamentals are real, nominal quantities will adjust to
whatever level is necessary.
40
This analysis has important implications for exchange rate management in the
ERM-2. First, the idea that the ERM-2 could serve as a “testing phase for the
central rate and the sustainability of convergence in general” (ECB 2003, p. 2)
is ill-conceived. It relies on the presumption that, in the run-up to the adoption
of the Euro, a new member state’s exchange rate with the Euro reflects its
fundamental economic performance relative to the Euro area. Instead, the
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39 This is consistent with the Greek experience in the late 1990s as described in Hochreiter and
Tavlas (2004a). When entering the ERM-2 in 1998, Greece chose a central parity that had the
Drachma undervalued relative to the Euro, allowing for the exchange rate to appreciate in the
subsequent months.
40 One might argue that price level adjustments downwards have more significant economic
costs than upwards adjustments due to the nature of nominal rigidities. If the period of adjustment
is relatively short, this would suggest a preference for erring on the high side when choosing the
conversion rate.
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adoption of the Euro, and the closer the critical date, the stronger its
dependence on these expectations. The point is best revealed by the
indeterminateness of the exchange rate when the authorities wish to leave the
determination of the conversion rate to the market. As the date of conversion
draws nearer, the exchange rate simply has no more information value
regarding the fundamental exchange rate or the appropriateness of the central
rate in the ERM-2.
Second, if uncertainty about the exchange rate fundamentals increases with
the length of time over which they are predicted (as it does if the
fundamentals follow a Brownian motion), the analysis indicates the trade-offs
to be considered in announcing the terms of Euro adoption. Early
announcements are desirable, because they keep the effect of the
announcement itself on the exchange rate small (equation (10)), and they
allow countries to enjoy the announcement benefits in terms of low exchange
rate variability (equation (8)) earlier. However, early announcements create
a bigger risk that a gap develops between the announced conversion rate and
the fundamentals at the time of adopting the Euro. In view of this, early
announcements may not be considered credible and may have to be changed
if fundamentals develop in an unexpected way, which generates new
exchange rate volatility. Yet, given the possibility of choosing a conversion
rate that differs from the fundamental rate, early announcements have the
advantage of leaving the relevant nominal variables, the exchange rates,
prices and wages, time to adjust smoothly. It is difficult to judge these
trade-offs in a general way. In the specific situation of the new member states,
the conclusion is that countries striving for a fast adoption of the Euro should
not postpone the announcement of the terms of conversion, while countries
that have chosen a longer waiting period anyway should refrain from making
any hints in this regard.
Third, our analysis implies that, once a new member state has announced its
intention to adopt the Euro in the near future, it is of paramount importance
to anchor market expectations about the conversion rate and the date of
adopting the Euro firmly. As market uncertainty about the terms of Euro
adoption and changing expectations translate into possibly large swings in
the exchange rate itself, improper information management could easily
undermine the viability of the ERM-2. This, again, speaks for an early
announcement of the terms of conversion. Leaving the relevant decisions
until very late in the process will make the conversion rate the subject of
political haggling over short-term economic benefits. This would create
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Euro.
41
Furthermore, the ECB and the European Commission should give up their
current position of keeping the terms of the Euro adoption open as long as
possible. Public statements that “countries that operate a Euro-based currency
board deemed to be sustainable might not be required to go through a double
regime shift.” (emphasis added) rather than will not be required to first float
“the currency within the ERM-2 only to repeg it to the Euro at a later stage”
(ECB 2003, p. 3), that their central parities remain open to negotiations, and
that central parities within the ERM-2, even if set by mutual agreement of all
relevant parties, “in no way prejudice the ultimate choice of the central rate”
for conversion (ibid. p. 4) simply create exchange rate uncertainty which is
completely unwarranted and can impose large economic costs on the new
member states. Clearly, the countries currently operating currency boards
with the Euro have no other choice but announce their current parities as the
future conversion rates to the Euro. Any deviation from that, and even the
possibility of this happening perceived by the markets could easily destroy
the currency board, with no obvious benefit for anybody. As a minimum
contribution to the monetary stability of the new member states, the ECB
should refrain from such general announcements.
Finally, our analysis shows that the announcement of a credible conversion rate
and conversion date sets the exchange rate on apath smoothly converging to the
final rate. In the absence of counterproductive policy announcements, the
market forces of speculation hold the exchange rate close to this path, without
any intervention from the central banks. From this perspective, the debate over
the appropriate width of the bands in the ERM-2 seems largely irrelevant at first
sight. Nevertheless, wide bands are clearly desirable for two reasons. First, an
early announcement could come with aconversion rate that requires adjustment
of the exchange rate of more that anarrow band might allow. In such asituation,
the narrow band would render the early announcement impossible. However,
the benefits from an early announcement in terms of exchange rate stability are
likely to far outweigh the benefits of narrow bands around an adjustable central
rate before the announcement of the terms of Euro adoption.
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41 See Begg et al. (1997). The wish to avoid such political effects was, perhaps, one of the
motivations that led the ECOFIN to announce the fixed-conversion rule at its Summit in Mondorf,
13–14 September 1997, i.e. more than seven months prior to the EU Summit in Brussels, 2–3 May
1998, where the members of EMU were decided. Although this was not made explicit, markets
widely interpreted this decision as taking the existing central parities as the internal conversion
rates to the Euro.
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to defend them, i.e., they create opportunities for one-sided bets against the
central bank. The history of the 1990s teaches that such bets greatly increase
the instability of exchange rate arrangements. In contrast, the original
members of the ERM used the wide bands to let their currencies converge to
the pre-announced conversion rates without central bank intervention. The
new member states should simply replicate that experience and, unless they
already operate currency board with the Euro, refrain from any unilateral
commitments to narrower bands.
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With the adoption of the Euro, the new member states will surrender their
own monetary policy and participate in the common monetary policy of the
ESCB, instead. Since EMU monetary policy cannot differentiate between
different geographical parts of the Euro area, member countries must use the
remaining tools of economic policy to adjust to asymmetric shocks, i.e.,
shocks that hit them in different ways or shocks to which their economies
react in different ways than the aggregate EMU. To evaluate
a country’s expected economic performance in a monetary union, literature in
the tradition of Mundell’s (1961) theory of optimum currency areas has,
therefore, asked two main questions: How likely will the country’s cyclical
stance differ from that of the aggregate EMU, and what is the country’s ability
to cope with asymmetric shocks. In this section, we focus on two aspects of
these questions. First, we look at the symmetry or asymmetry of business
cycles between the Euro area and the new member states. Next, we consider
the degree of labor market flexibility in several of the new member states,
since labor market flexibility is commonly regarded an important mechanism
for adjustment to asymmetric shocks.
6.1. Convergence of Business Cycles
A high degree of business-cycle synchronization is widely taken as an
indication that the probability of asymmetric shocks is low and, therefore, the
cost of monetary policy independence is limited (Frankel and Rose, 1998,
Alesina, Barro and Tenreyro, 2002, Artis et al, 2003, Frankel, 2004). For the
transition economies among the new member states, this is a difficult issue to
assess, because their cyclical behavior was shaped predominantly by the large
drop in economic output and employment following the opening of their
economies in the 1990s, and the subsequent, strong recovery. Furthermore,
the period for which macro economic data exist is still too short to contain
much more than one cycle. Thus, the analysis of cyclical patterns for these
countries must be interpreted with caution.
Nevertheless, several empirical studies exist. Backé et al. (2004) note that
average growth rates were higher in the new member states than in the Euro
area between 1996 and 2003, and so was the volatility of growth rates. The
same authors compare the correlation between quarterly, detrended GDP
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between detrended GDP growth in Sweden, Denmark, the UK (pre-ins),
Portugal and the Euro area. They find that all these correlations are
substantially lower for the new member states except Hungary and Slovenia.
Artis et al. (2003) use a variety of filters to extract the cyclical components
from real GDP and industrial production in the eight Central European new
member states and estimate the correlations with the cyclical GDP and
industrial production series in the Euro area. They find a low correlation of
business cycles with the Euro area, but a high correlation of the business
cycles with Germany. Backé et al. (2004) also estimate correlations between
HP-filtered industrial output in the new member states and the Euro area.
While the correlation between the industrial output series is generally
stronger, only Hungary, Slovenia and the Slovak Republic have correlation
coefficients with the Euro area close to those of the pre-ins, a result consistent
with those in Darvas and Szapary (2003) and Süppel (2003).
Boone and Maurel (1999) argue that economic cycles in the CEE countries
are similar to the business cycle in Germany. They estimate that between 55
and 86 percent of the fluctuation in unemployment in CEE countries can be
explained by “German” shocks. Babetsky, Boone and Maurel (2002) confirm
this conclusion. Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2003) use a structural VAR approach
to decompose cyclical fluctuations of output and inflation into demand and
supply shocks, and then estimate the correlation between these shocks in the
new member states except Cyprus and Malta and the Euro area. They, too,
find generally low correlations except for Hungary, and that demand shocks
in the new member states are less correlated with their counterparts in the
Euro area than supply shocks.
We  estimate bilateral correlation coefficients of the business cycles in the
Central European new member states (CE-EU-8) and the incumbent members
of the Euro area. We use a Baxter-King (1999) filter to extract the cyclical
components from quarterly real GDP series from 1990:1 to 2003:3. The
results are shown in Table 14. The table shows that correlations of business
cycles among the current Euro-area countries are higher than the correlations
between them and the CE-EU-8 countries. Correlations of business cycles
between the CE-EU-8 countries are lower. Among the Euro area countries,
Belgium, Austria and the Netherlands have the highest average correlations
with the Euro area countries and Portugal, Greece and Germany the lowest.
The Netherlands, Germany, Belgium and Austria have the highest
correlations with the acceding countries while Greece, France and Italy the
lowest. Among the acceding countries Poland, Slovenia and Hungary are the
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the Czech Republic are the least correlated. Hungary, Slovenia and Estonia
are the most correlated with the other Central European countries and the
Czech Republic, Lithuania and Poland the least correlated. These results are
in line with the earlier results reported above.
Based on this evidence, it is clear that the new member states do not form part
of an optimal currency area, as they will have to cope with relatively frequent,
asymmetric shocks. The countries most exposed to such shocks are Lithuania,
Latvia, Estonia, and the Czech and the Slovak Republics. Among these, the
Baltic countries have not had an independent monetary policy in recent years
anyway. For the Czech and Slovak Republics, maintaining flexibility of
exchange rates and independence over the monetary policy may have some
value in terms of macro economic stabilization.
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Table 14: Correlations of Business Cycles with the Euro Area and with the new EU
members
Correlations of business cycles
a, Correlations of business cycles
a,
with the Euro area, 1990:1–2003:3 with the new EU countries,
1990:1–2003:3
Euro Area Countries
Belgium 0.56 0.06
Germany 0.31 0.06
Greece 0.33 –0.00
Spain 0.44 0.05
France 0.46 0.04
Italy 0.38 0.04
Netherlands 0.50 0.06
Austria 0.55 0.06
Portugal 0.28 0.04
Finland 0.42 0.05
New EU countries
Czech Republic –0.09 –0.04
Estonia –0.03 0.03
Hungary 0.18 0.04
Lithuania –0.29 –0.01
Latvia –0.03 0.01
Poland 0.40 –0.01
Slovenia 0.32 0.03
Slovakia –0.26 0.00
a weighted averages using population shares as weights
Source: Traistaru (2004)
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member states is fairly low, too. This is good news for their EMU
membership. It implies that the new members would not enter EMU with
strongly coherent interests regarding the monetary stabilization policy of the
ECB. They are, therefore, unlikely to frequently find themselves in a coalition
voting for an adjustment of interest rates in their common favor, which might
pose a problem for ECB decision making if the new members were a strongly
coherent group.
The conclusion regarding the appropriateness of EMU membership must be
put into perspective. First, as pointed out before, the value of having
a national currency is not very large from the perspective of macro economic
stabilization for the majority of the new member states. Second, the general
conclusion of the empirical literature on EMU in the 1990s was that the
current member states were far from forming an optimum currency area, too
(Eichengreen, 1992; Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1993 and 1997). Third, and
related to that point, while the optimum-currency area literature treats
business-cycle correlation patterns as exogenous to the monetary regime,
there are good reasons to believe that they are not. Cyclical correlation
patterns are shaped by structural characteristics such as the similarity of
production structures and trade patterns (Clark and van Wincoop, 2001; Rose
and Engel, 2002; Calderon, Chong and Stein, 2003, Frankel, 2004), which are
likely to change due to increasing economic and monetary integration.
Figure 11: Similarity of Economic Structures and Business Cycles Synchronization
Source: Own computation based on EUROSTAT data
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correlations with the Euro area against the index of structural dissimilarity
defined above. Recall that a high value on this index means a low degree of
similarity. The figure reveals a strong, negative correlation between the two.
That is, countries which exhibit more structural similarity also exhibit more
strongly correlated business cycles. The regression shown in the figure
indicates that this correlation is statistically significant.
While Figure 11 is informative, the causality of the relationship between the
similarity of sectoral structures and correlations of business cycles must be
treated more formally (Traistaru, 2004). We do this by estimating
a two-equation model for sectoral specialization and business-cycle
correlation. The first step is to regress the dissimilarity index on a set of
instruments:
R
2 = 0.44 (12)
Here, (SPECij)T is the index of bilateral dissimilarity of sectoral structures in
countries i and j
42 and  ω(i,i)T is the error term. EUROij is a dummy variable
which is equal to one, if countries i and j are members of the Euro area, and
zero for the other country-pairs. (POPi)T denotes the average population in
country i during the period T. DISTij is the distance between the capitals of
countries i and j measured as the shortest road connection in km. BORDERij
is a dummy variable which is equal to one, if countries i and j share a common
border, and zero otherwise. The numbers below the coefficients are standard
errors; ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the five and one percent
levels, respectively. The regression uses data from 1990 to 2003 and is based
on all country-pairs in our sample, i.e., 153 observations.
Next, we use the estimated dissimilarity index from (12) to explain the
bilateral correlation of business cycles.
R
2 = 0.09 (13)
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42 . ski is the share of sector k in the GDPin country i calculated as average 
over the analyzed period. The index is calculated using data on gross value added in constant
prices for six sectors according to the NACE-6 classification
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c,Yj
c)T denotes the bilateral correlation of the cyclical components
of real GDP in countries i and j. The regression analysis indicates that, after
correcting for the reversed causality, more dissimilar sectoral structures cause
a lower correlation of the business cycles between two countries. The
obtained coefficients are statistically significant at the one-percent level of
confidence. To the extent that the structural similarity between the new
member states and the incumbent Euro-area countries will continue to grow,
this suggests that the correlation of business cycles between them and the
Euro area will increase.
Figure 12: Trade Integration and Business Cycles Synchronization
Source: Own computations based on EUROSTAT data
We  perform a similar analysis with regard to the bilateral trade intensities
between the new member states and the Euro area countries. Figure 12 shows
a clear, positive relationship between the trade intensity and business cycles
correlations over the period 1990:1-2003:3. Again, this result is only a simple
correlation. The causality of this relationship can be accounted for with
a regression analysis (see Traistaru, 2004). As before, we first estimate an
instrumental variables model for the bilateral trade intensities:
R
2 = 0.60 (14)
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43, the
other variables have been explained above, and υ(i,j)T is the error term. Next,
we regress the bilateral correlation coefficients on the instrumented trade
intensities, which yields the following estimated result for the bilateral
correlations of cyclical components of economic activity (real GDP) in
countries i and j over the period 1990:1-2003:2:
R
2 = 0.19 (15)
The obtained coefficients are statistically significant at the one-percent level
of significance. The results indicate that countries with more intensive trade
links exhibit more similar business cycle patterns. Again, this evidence
suggests that cyclical patterns of the new member states will converge to
those of the incumbent Euro-area members as trade intensity grows. Since
these above results might be sensitive to non-observed, country-specific
characteristics, we estimated the same models excluding first Greece and
Portugal, then Germany and then Poland. The results are qualitatively
similar.
44
6.2. Wage Flexibility
The Optimum Currency Area (OCA) literature underlines that flexible labor
markets in the countries wishing to join a monetary union mitigate the cost of
losing independence over monetary policy. As an adjustment mechanism to
asymmetric shocks, labor market flexibility has gained increasing importance
in the context of EMU (Pissarides, 1997, European Commission, 2004).
Existing empirical evidence indicates that mobility of labor across sectors and
regions in the new EU countries is low, like in the incumbent countries (Fidrmuc,
2004; Huber, 2004). However, the new EU countries perform better in other areas
of labor market flexibility such as employment protection legislation,
unemployment benefit systems, minimum-wage policies wage-setting and wage
flexibility (Backé et al., 2004; Ederveen and Thissen, 2004; Boeri, 2004).
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43 . Xijt: exports of country i to country j in year t; Mij: imports
of country i from country j in year t; Fit: total trade flows of country i in year t
44 The results are available from the authors on request.
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(European Commission, 2004). An often-used measure of wage flexibility is
the responsiveness of wages to the rate of unemployment, or real wage
flexibility. If wages were responsive to unemployment, they help equilibrate
demand and supply in labor markets. Aparticular case of real wage flexibility
is the responsiveness of regional wages to local labor market conditions.
A growing empirical literature flowing from Blanchflower and Oswald
(1994) has looked at the relationship between regional wages and local
unemployment in the EU accession countries during the 1990s and uncovered
a negative relationship between these two variables suggesting that regional
wages adjusted to the local unemployment rates. For example, Kertesi and
Köllo (1997, 1999) found unemployment elasticities of pay in Hungary in the
range of (–0.09) to (–0.11) using micro data matched with data from 170 labor
office districts. Duffy and Walsh (2001) used individual data from labor
surveys and data for 49 regions for Poland and found that the unemployment
elasticity of pay was in the range of –0.08 to –0.11. In the case of Eastern
Germany, Elhorst et al. (2002) obtained an unemployment elasticity of pay of
–0.112 using individual data for 114 districts. Iara and Traistaru (2004) find
that regional average wages adjusted contemporaneously to local market
conditions in Bulgaria and Poland while in Hungary the adjustment of
regional average pay to local unemployment took place with a 2-year delay.
Kállai and Traistaru (1998) use aggregate regional data from 41 regions in
Romania and find an unemployment elasticity of pay of –0.09. Blanchflower
(2001) finds unemployment elasticities to pay ranging from 0.003 to (–0.052)
in regressions for nine EU accession countries and six successors of the
former Soviet Union.
These results suggest that wages could act as an adjustment mechanism to
region-specific shocks in the new EU countries. Furthermore, in comparison
to the incumbent EU countries, the unemployment elasticities of pay in the
new EU countries are found higher (see Büttner, 2003). Nevertheless, in some
countries, this adjustment is likely to take place, with a certain delay, which
implies that labor market disequilibria might persist.
Here, we bring further evidence about the responsiveness of regional wages
to local unemployment rates using a panel of 41 NUTS-2 regions in the ten
new EU countries over the period 1993–2003
45. We estimate the following
model as suggested by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994):
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where wr,t is the regional compensation per employee in region r at time t, α
is a constant, Ur,t is the unemployment rate in region r at time t, Xr,t is a vector
of variables controlling for the regional economic structure (the shares of
regional gross value added in agriculture, industry, market and non-market
services in regional GDP), µr is a time invariant region-specific effect, λt is
a region-invariant time specific effect and εr,t is the stochastic error term.
Table 15 shows the country-specific unemployment elasticities of pay
46. Our
results indicate that regional wages are responsive to local unemployment
rates in the Baltic countries and Slovakia. A doubling of the unemployment
rate is associated with a 15 percent reduction in the average wage in the three
Baltic countries and a reduction of 6 percent in Slovakia. In contrast, in
Cyprus, Malta and Hungary, a rising in the local unemployment is associated
with an increase in the regional wages suggesting a mechanism of
“compensating differential” across regions.
In these cases, a doubling of the unemployment rate results in an increase of
the regional wage by 55 percent in the case of Cyprus and Malta and
15 percent in Hungary, respectively. Furthermore, we do not find evidence for
the responsiveness of regional wages to local unemployment conditions in the
cases of Poland and the Czech Republic. An additional measure of wage
flexibility is the responsiveness of wages to changes in productivity. We look
at the responsiveness of regional wages to changes in local productivity by
estimating the following model:
(17)
∆lnwr,t is the change in the compensation per employee in region r at time t,
α is a constant, ∆lnWr,t–1is the change in the productivity (gross value added
per employee) in region r at time t–1, Xr,t is a vector of variables controlling
for the regional economic structure (the shares of regional gross added value
in agriculture, industry, market and non-market services in regional GDP), µr
is a time invariant region-specific effect, λt is a region-invariant time specific
effect and εr,t the error term. We use the same panel of 41 regions in the ten
Macroeconomic adjustment under EMU 63
46 The country specific unemployment elasticities of pay are the coefficients of an interacted
variable obtained by interacting country-specific time dummies with the variables of interest.
Given the small number of observations we pooled together Cyprus and Malta as well as the three
Baltic countries
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observations. The country-specific estimates
47 are shown in Table 16.
Our estimates indicate that, in the Baltic countries, Poland and the Czech and
Slovak Republics regional wages are responsive to changes in local
productivity. The magnitude of this wage adjustment is the highest in the
Baltic countries where a one percent increase in the local productivity in the
previous period translates into a rise by 2 percent of the regional
compensation per employee. The respective wage increases are lower in the
other three countries mentioned above, 1.3 percent in the Czech Republic,
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Table 15: Wage Flexibility in the New EU Member States, 1993–2003
Elasticity of regional wages Regional wages
with respect to local responsiveness with 
unemployment rates respect to changes in the
local productivity levels
a
Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia 0.5551*** 0.2890
(0.0406) (0.4230)
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania –0.1567*** 1.9353***
(0.0384) (0.2670)
Czech Republic 0.0324 1.3186***
(0.0222) (0.1408)
Hungary 0.1487*** 0.0415
(0.0343) (0.1590)
Poland 0.0037 1.4768***
(0.0150) (0.1038)
Slovak Republic –0.0633*** 0.7386***
(0.0224) (0.1772)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes
N observations 451 369
R
2 0.7044 0.3773
Data source: European Regional Database, Cambridge Econometrics
a gross value added per employed
Robust standard errors in parentheses
***, **, * significant at 1, 5, 10 percent
The regressions include a constant and the following control variables: the shares of agriculture, industry,
market-services, non-market services in regional gross value added
The data covers 41 NUTS 2 regions in the ten new EU countries. The number of NUTS 2 regions in each
country is as follows:
Cyprus: 1; Malta: 1; Estonia: 1; Latvia:1; Lithuania:1; Slovenia: 1; Czech Republic: 8; Hungary: 7;
Poland: 16; Slovakia: 4
47 Estimates obtained by interacting country-specific dummies with the variable of interest
4_2006  14/12/06  15:36  Stránka 641.5 percent in Poland and about 0.75 percent in the Slovak Republic. This
evidence suggests that in these six countries changes in productivity have
a positive impact on wage demands while in Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia and
Hungary productivity changes do not seem to influence the outcome of wage
negotiations. These findings suggest that in the new EU countries there is
a fair degree of wage flexibility that can facilitate the adjustment to demand
and supply shocks.
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Over the past decade the ten new EU members have achieved a high degree
of market integration and macroeconomic stabilization as part of their
accession process. The main challenges ahead for these countries are to cope
with large and potentially volatile capital inflows and to achieve the nominal
convergence required for the adoption of the Euro. These challenges must be
tackled under constrained fiscal policies: there is little room for the public
sectors to grow, and several governments must make efforts to reign in
deficits.
Several conclusions emerge from our discussion of macro economic
adjustment. First, macro fiscal policies will be at the forefront of macro
economic policies in the years to come. They will have to focus on meeting
the sustainability requirement for EMU, and help absorb the aggregate
demand effects of large capital inflows. As long as capital inflows persist,
these two requirements are complementary. Macro economic stability would
best be promoted by more effective spending controls and improved
budgeting procedures.
Second, large capital inflows create a risk of sudden stops leading to large
economic and financial imbalances. Prudent banking and financial market
supervision are necessary to avoid credit booms and asset price bubbles that
make such scenarios more likely, but also to reduce the vulnerability of the
financial sector and the exposure of the government to implicit liabilities that
could result from a capital account crisis. Governments would be well advised
to keep substantial safety markings both with regard to deficits and debt to
assure that they can respond to a sudden stop with the necessary financial
rescue of the banking system and a fiscal expansion to partly absorb the fall
in aggregate demand without losing the prospect of making it into EMU for
a long time. This adds to the incentives to curtail the growth of the public
sector.
Third, the best way to enter EMU would be to set monetary policy in
accordance with the low-inflation and low-interest rate criterion and to enter
EMU as soon as these and the sustainability criterion are met. We argue that
Poland and the Czech Republic are the only two new member states for which
a late entry makes sense, given that they have demonstrated the potential for
an autonomous, stability-oriented monetary policy based on inflation targets.
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reforms as necessary in a less restrictive macro economic environment. For
the remaining countries, the best strategy is to enter EMU as fast as possible.
Fourth, the decision to insist on the ERM-2 requirement or to let countries
that meet the other nominal convergence criteria enter EMU immediately is
essentially a decision about allocating macro economic risks. There is little
reason to believe that ERM-2 membership leads to better policies. Nor is
ERM-2 membership required for a smooth conversion of the national
currencies to the Euro. While the question of who carries more risk ultimately
can only be settled by political agreement, one should note that the downside
risk is by far greater for the new members, if they are forced to go through the
ERM-2, since their influence on EMU monetary policy would be very limited
even if they became full members immediately. One has to assume a very
high degree of risk aversion of the incumbent relative to the new members, or
that the new members would push EMU monetary policy towards much
higher inflation rates to justify the ERM-2 requirement.
Finally, the new member states are obviously not part of an optimum currency
area in the traditional sense, but this is no different from the first members of
EMU. Yet, there are good reasons to believe that their business cycles will
converge to the Euro-area cycle as trade integration with the EU proceeds. At
the same time, the new member states’ labor markets are characterized by
a fair degree of wage flexibility, which will facilitate macro economic
adjustment to asymmetric shocks once they are in EMU. From this
perspective, there is no reason to advocate a slow route to EMU.
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